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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued two landmark decisions
about the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. District of Columbia v.
Heller rejected the notion that the Second Amendment protects only organized militia activities, and McDonald v. City of Chicago found that the right to
keep and bear arms applies to state and local governments via incorporation
into the Fourteenth Amendment. Those decisions left important questions unanswered. In particular, the Supreme Court declined to specify what level of
scrutiny or test should be used to assess the validity of gun laws. Lower courts
are now wrestling with that crucial issue. Examining the decisions made so
far, this Article argues that the third phase of the fight over the right to keep
and bear arms is moving toward an unusual result. The lower court decisions
reflect the pragmatic sentiments of Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinions in Heller and McDonald. Frustrated by the predominantly historical approach and
the puzzling categorizations suggested by Justice Scalia and the other members of the Heller and McDonald majorities, the lower courts have focused on
contemporary public policy interests and applied a form of intermediate scrutiny that is highly deferential to legislative determinations and leads to all but
the most drastic restrictions on guns being upheld. Justice Breyer thus stands
poised to achieve an unexpected triumph despite having come out on the losing side of both of the Supreme Court’s recent clashes over the right to keep
and bear arms.
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INTRODUCTION
History shows that one can lose significant battles but still win the
war. The ancient Greeks suffered devastating losses at Thermopylae
and Artemisium, but one year later they drove out the invading Persian forces.1 The Romans endured fifteen years of defeats after Hannibal lumbered across the Alps into Italy, yet they ultimately managed
to force him to retreat.2 George Washington lost most of the major
battles as commander of the Continental Army, but the Americans’
revolutionary efforts nevertheless succeeded in the end.3 World War
II began badly for the British and French at Dunkirk and for the
United States at Pearl Harbor and Kasserine Pass, but the Allies
eventually prevailed.4 Defeats sometimes lay the groundwork for improbable future success.
In the realm of constitutional law, this phenomenon is now occurring in the context of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms.5 That right has been the subject of intense legal conflict in recent years. After more than two centuries without ever striking down
any law as violating the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court rePETER GREEN, THE GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 109–271 (1996).
NIGEL BAGNALL, THE PUNIC WARS: ROME, CARTHAGE, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
MEDITERRANEAN 168–299 (Thomas Dunne Books 2005) (1990).
3 RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 457 (2010).
4 ANDREW ROBERTS, THE STORM OF WAR: A NEW HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD
WAR 59–68, 185–93, 310–12 (2011).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
1
2
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cently made two decisions hailed as landmark victories for gun rights.6
In District of Columbia v. Heller,7 the Court struck down several laws
that severely restricted ownership and use of guns in the Nation’s capital, including a provision that essentially banned possession of handguns.8 Rejecting the notion that the Second Amendment applies only
to activities of organized state militias, the Court concluded that the
Amendment instead extends more broadly to the use of guns for other
purposes, such as defending one’s “hearth and home” from criminals.9
Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,10 the Court found
that Chicago’s handgun ban was also unconstitutional because the
right to keep and bear arms applies to state and local laws through the
Fourteenth Amendment.11
The Heller and McDonald decisions resolved important questions
about the right to keep and bear arms, and at first blush they appeared to swing momentum decisively toward gun rights and away
from gun control efforts. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s decisions left vital questions unanswered. In particular, the Court declined to specify exactly what test or type of analysis should be used to
assess the constitutionality of the wide variety of legal restrictions imposed on guns.12 Rather than spelling out what level of constitutional
scrutiny or other standard should be used, the Court left lower courts
to grapple with this difficult but enormously important issue.
Lower court judges across the country have now had several
years to begin the task of assembling the “plumbing” of the right to
keep and bear arms,13 deciding what sort of analysis should be used
and applying that analysis to determine which laws can withstand con6 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570 (2008); see Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—in Theory and Practice,
56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1412–13 (2011) (noting that Heller was the first case in which the Supreme Court ever struck down a law on Second Amendment grounds).
7

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

8

Id. at 574–75, 635.

9

Id. at 635.

10

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).

11

Id. at 3050.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35 (acknowledging that the Court did not specify a level of
scrutiny for Second Amendment claims and left many issues unresolved regarding the application of the right).
13 See Stuart Banner, The Second Amendment, So Far, 117 HARV. L. REV. 898, 907 (2004)
(reviewing DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003)) (originating the “plumbing”
metaphor).
12
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stitutional attack.14 The work has not been quick or easy. Without
clear or complete guidance from the Supreme Court, lower court
judges have proposed an array of different approaches and formulations, producing a “morass of conflicting lower court opinions” regarding the proper analysis to apply.15
Although the Supreme Court’s rulings in Heller and McDonald
naturally garnered enormous attention, this third battle, playing out in
the lower courts, ultimately is of even greater importance. It is in the
application of these rulings that “the Second Amendment rubber
meets the road” and the actual impact of these constitutional issues on
Americans’ lives will be determined.16
Examining the stream of decisions made thus far by the lower
courts, this Article describes the problems that courts have encountered, the varying approaches that courts have taken, and the direction in which the judicial consensus seems to be heading. The courts
generally have been very cautious and practical in handling the important issues facing them. While trying to follow the Supreme Court’s
lead, they have not mimicked its approach. Justice Antonin Scalia’s
majority opinion in Heller heavily emphasized historical investigation
of the original meaning and traditional understandings of the right to
keep and bear arms.17 Justice Scalia also viewed the right in categorical terms, suggesting that courts should try to clearly demarcate the
types of guns, people, and activities protected rather than letting analysis degenerate into a more subjective and volatile “interest-balancing
inquiry” that would empower judges to let their personal predilections
dictate decisions.18 The lower courts, frustrated by the indeterminacy
of historical inquiry and puzzled by the categorizations suggested by
Justice Scalia, have steered in other directions. They have effectively
Id. (“What exactly will the doctrine look like? What kinds of regulations will be unconstitutional? Which guns? Which people? Which situations?”).
15 United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 688–89 (4th Cir. 2010) (Davis, J., concurring in
the judgment); see also Ryan Menard, Note, Aiming Without a Scope: How Courts Scrutinize
Gun Laws After District of Columbia v. Heller, 3 NE. U. L.J. 289, 327 (2011) (describing “inconsistency, confusion, and hesitation” in lower courts’ decisions).
16 United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring); see also Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1560 (2009).
17 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–619; see also Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v.
Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 924 (2009) (“[T]he opinions in Heller represent
the most important and extensive debate on the role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation among the members of the contemporary Supreme Court.”).
18 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–29, 634–35; Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in
First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 405–11 (2009) (describing Justice
Scalia’s categorical approach).
14
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embraced the sort of interest-balancing approach that Justice Scalia
condemned, adopting an intermediate scrutiny test and applying it in a
way that is highly deferential to legislative determinations and that
leads to all but the most drastic restrictions on guns being upheld.
Indeed, this Article contends that the Supreme Court’s revival of
interest in the right to keep and bear arms may ultimately have a surprising outcome. The lower courts’ duty, of course, is to implement
the rulings made by the majority of the Supreme Court. But in this
instance, the lower courts’ decisions strongly reflect the pragmatic
spirit of the dissenting opinions that Justice Stephen Breyer wrote in
Heller and McDonald. Justice Breyer warned that the search for historical, logical, and conceptual answers to difficult Second Amendment questions would prove to be futile, and he urged courts to read
and apply the Constitution in ways that respect legislative judgments
rather than obstructing the search for practical solutions to difficult
problems.19 Thus far, Justice Breyer’s approach appears headed for
an unexpected triumph in the third battle over the Second Amendment now being waged in the courts.
Part I of this Article reviews the first major fight over the right to
keep and bear arms, which the Supreme Court resolved in Heller by
deciding that the Second Amendment’s protection extends beyond
militia activities. In particular, this part of the Article looks carefully
at the aspects of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller that were
oddly enigmatic but would become highly important for lower courts
trying to implement the Court’s decision. This part of the Article also
explains the alternative approach to gun rights put forward by Justice
Breyer in his Heller dissent. Part II looks at the second skirmish in
this constitutional conflict, describing the Supreme Court’s resolution
of the incorporation issue in McDonald and the aspects of that decision that supply additional clues to the lower courts. Part III turns to
the lower court decisions. Reviewing each of the key issues with
which the courts have been struggling, the Article argues that a consensus has begun to emerge among lower court judges about how to
handle government actions allegedly infringing on the right to keep
19 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3122 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Heller, 554 U.S. at 687, 719 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Linda Greenhouse, “Weighing Needs
and Burdens:” Justice Breyer’s Heller Dissent, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 299 (2008) (describing how
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Heller typifies his pragmatic approach to constitutional law); Richard
Schragger, The Last Progressive: Justice Breyer, Heller, and “Judicial Judgment,” 59 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 283, 284 (2008) (describing Breyer’s dissent in Heller as taking a “progressive” approach
that is “context-specific, non-categorical, expertise-driven, and infused by a common law
sensibility”).
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and bear arms. The courts have generally encountered difficulties
with the more historically oriented and rigidly categorical modes of
decisionmaking exemplified by Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller.
They have steered away from those approaches and toward a more
pragmatic consideration of contemporary public policy considerations,
with a strong dose of deference to legislative determinations about
complex empirical issues. That approach is much like the analysis that
Justice Breyer encouraged in his Heller and McDonald dissents.
Part IV argues that the lower courts’ handling of these matters
has significant virtues no matter what one thinks about the ideal extent of regulation of firearms. The lower courts have essentially made
judicial restraint their guiding principle. That is a prudent course of
action under the circumstances, particularly given the lack of clear instructions from the Supreme Court, the dramatic variation in the roles
that guns play in urban and rural environments, the tremendous political power that gun owners possess, and the perils of having judges step
well beyond their expertise to undertake a dramatic revamping of the
complex array of laws affecting firearms throughout the Nation.
I. THE FIRST BATTLE: DISTRICT

OF

COLUMBIA V. HELLER

For most of the twentieth century, the meaning of the Second
Amendment seemed well settled. Courts consistently read it as guaranteeing a right to have and use guns only for purposes of organized
state militia activity.20 A trickle of law review articles began to question that view, suggesting that the right instead should apply more
broadly to other uses of guns, such as self-defense and hunting.21 The
trickle turned into a large outpouring of scholarly literature on both
sides of the question.22 Courts eventually began to take notice, and a
circuit split soon emerged on the issue.23
20 See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted? Lower Court Interpretations
of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961, 970–72 (1996)
(describing the “collective judicial assumption” that the Second Amendment protects militias
and does not provide a broader individual right).
21 See, e.g., Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation,
2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381 (1960); Robert A. Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.B.A. J. 554
(1965).
22 See Banner, supra note 13, at 898–99 (describing how the Second Amendment became
the focus of substantial academic attention).
23 See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Second
Amendment guarantees the people’s collective right to maintain effective state militias but not
an individual right to own or possess guns), abrogated by United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d
1111 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 294 (2010); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260
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In 2008, the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller resolved this basic question about the Second Amendment’s scope. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, concluded that the Amendment’s
text plainly guaranteed a right to individuals and not just to state militias.24 Indeed, Justice Scalia determined that individuals’ lawful use of
guns for self-defense was the “central component”25 or “core” purpose of the right.26 The Amendment’s prefatory clause about a “well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,”27 did
not narrow the scope of the right; instead, it merely explained a key
reason for the right’s inclusion in the Bill of Rights.28 Justice Scalia
bolstered his interpretation with historical evidence from before and
after the Second Amendment’s ratification supporting his broad reading of the provision’s scope.29 He made clear from the outset that he
perceived his mission to be determining what the Second Amendment
meant to ordinary Americans at the time of its adoption.30 The opinion, with its intensely historical perspective, has been hailed by some
as a “triumph for originalism.”31
A voluminous amount of commentary has already been written
about whether Justice Scalia correctly interpreted the Second Amendment as reaching broadly beyond organized militia activities.32 Although the purpose of this Article is not to revisit that debate,33
(5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to the private
possession and use of guns unrelated to militia participation).
24 Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–92.
25 Id. at 599.
26 Id. at 630; see also id. at 635 (concluding that the Second Amendment “surely elevates
above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home”).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
28 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595–99.
29 See, e.g., id. at 592–95, 605–19.
30 See id. at 576–77.
31 Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 684 (2009) (describing this reception among some legal academics but questioning the extent of the victory); see also J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 256
(2009) (“While Heller can be hailed as a triumph of originalism, it can just as easily be seen as
the opposite—an exposé of original intent as a theory no less subject to judicial subjectivity and
endless argumentation than any other.”); Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2008, at WK1.
32 See, e.g., Symposium, District of Columbia v. Heller, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 165 (2008);
Symposium, The Second Amendment After District of Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 315 (2009); Symposium, The Second Amendment After Heller, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1203
(2008–2009); Symposium, The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms After D.C. v.
Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041 (2009).
33 For my assessment of Justice Scalia’s opinion, see Allen Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights
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careful examination of Justice Scalia’s opinion is nevertheless important because of the light it sheds on the questions that courts are still
struggling to answer, including what level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment claims. In this respect, several features of Justice
Scalia’s opinion stand out.
A. Law-Abiding, Responsible Citizens
While construing the Second Amendment broadly in some ways,
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller repeatedly emphasized the existence
of important limits on the right. “Of course the right was not unlimited,” Justice Scalia explained, “just as the First Amendment’s right of
free speech was not.”34 Scalia went on to recognize specifically that
the Second Amendment should protect a right to use guns only for
lawful purposes. He explained that “we do not read the Second
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort
of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”35 Scalia instead
suggested that the right to keep and bear arms protects only the interests of “law-abiding, responsible citizens” who use guns to protect
their homes and families or for other lawful, socially beneficial purposes.36 In short, the Second Amendment was not meant to assist
those who would use guns to commit crimes such as murders, assaults,
or robberies.
B. Arms in Common Use at the Time
Justice Scalia also indicated that the Second Amendment’s protection does not extend to all types of guns. Instead, the Amendment
merely guarantees a right to have the types of weapons commonly
used by Americans for lawful, nonmilitary purposes such as self-defense.37 Scalia derived this limitation on the Second Amendment’s
reach from the Supreme Court’s cryptic 1939 decision in United States
v. Miller,38 where the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to an
and Improving Gun Control After District of Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
383, 385–94 (2009).
34 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
35 Id.; see also id. at 626 (noting that commentators and courts before the twentieth century “routinely explained” that the right to keep and bear arms “was not a right to keep and
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose”).
36 Id. at 635; see also id. at 625 (concluding that the Second Amendment protects only
those guns commonly used “by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”).
37 Id. at 624–25, 627.
38 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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indictment charging two men with violating the federal restrictions on
possession of sawed-off or other short-barreled shotguns.39 Although
Justice Scalia otherwise found Miller to be a “virtually unreasoned
case,”40 he emphasized Miller’s observation that militia participants
ordinarily “were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.”41 Scalia thus affirmed Miller’s conclusion that “the Second Amendment does not
protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes.”42 Citing Blackstone and a smattering of nineteenth-century treatises, cases, and other sources, Scalia concluded
that limiting the Second Amendment’s reach in this way was “fairly
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of
‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”43
Applying the “common use” requirement, Justice Scalia unequivocally found that handguns qualify for protection because they “are
the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the
home.”44 On the other hand, Scalia hinted that short-barreled shotguns are not in common use today, just as they were not in common
use at the time of the Miller decision in 1939.45 Moreover, Scalia suggested that machine guns46 are also outside the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protection because they are not in common use among
American civilians.47 At the oral argument in the Heller case, Justice
Scalia stated even more clearly that he thinks machine guns are too
unusual to qualify for Second Amendment protection.48 Even if more
than one hundred thousand Americans legally own machine guns,
they still represent only a small fraction of the Nation’s population,
and therefore Scalia believes those weapons are “quite unusual” and
too uncommon to receive the Second Amendment’s protection.49
39

Id. at 183.

40

Heller, 554 U.S. at 624 n.24.

41

Id. at 624 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).

42

Id. at 625.

43

Id. at 627.

44

Id. at 629.

45

Id. at 625.

A machine gun is any firearm capable of firing more than one shot with a single pull of
the trigger. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2006).
46

47 Heller, 554 U.S. at 624 (stating that it would be “startling” to interpret the Second
Amendment in a way that would render unconstitutional the federal statutory restrictions on
machine guns).
48

Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290).

49

Id.
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Many logical objections to Justice Scalia’s common use approach
spring readily to mind. Although it makes good sense not to recognize a right to possess extraordinarily dangerous weapons, it is more
difficult to see why a gun should fall outside the scope of the right to
keep and bear arms merely because it is uncommon. If a weapon was
widely used and originally understood to be within the scope of the
right to keep and bear arms, why should it lose its constitutional protection merely because the number of its users dwindles over the
years? In addition, Scalia’s approach gives governments an incentive
to ban new types of weapons as soon as they appear, so that they
never become common enough to receive constitutional protection.
The common use requirement also means that the Second Amendment does not cover the potent and sophisticated military weaponry
that would be necessary today to counter the greatest threats to the
security of a free state. Justice Scalia recognized these objections in
Heller, but shrugged them off, saying that the Court’s job is merely to
read the Constitution and to apply the rights contained within it, not
to rewrite the law to achieve more sensible results or to accommodate
modern developments.50
C. The List of Presumptively Lawful Regulatory Measures
The Supreme Court’s decision in Heller thus imposed several important and relatively clear limitations on the Second Amendment’s
scope, specifying that it would protect only law-abiding citizens’ rights
to own and use common types of guns for lawful purposes. After that,
Justice Scalia’s opinion took a somewhat mysterious turn. Reiterating
that Blackstone and other early commentators saw the right to keep
and bear arms as having some limits, just like other constitutional
rights, Scalia noted that courts in the nineteenth century generally upheld laws banning the carrying of concealed guns in public places.51
Scalia followed that observation with a sentence that has received
more attention than any other part of the Heller opinion:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
50
51

Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28.
Id. at 627.

2012]

JUSTICE BREYER’S TRIUMPH

713

buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.52
The Court hastened to note that it provided this list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” merely to offer some examples,
and that the list “does not purport to be exhaustive.”53 Indeed, later
in the opinion, the Court specifically mentioned another example, saying that its analysis should not be read to “suggest the invalidity of
laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”54
Scalia’s decision to provide a list of presumptively lawful measures is perplexing for several reasons. The list is obviously dictum
because none of the types of laws on the list was at issue in the Heller
case, and therefore the Court’s statements about them were not necessary elements for analyzing the issues before the Court.55 Moreover,
it seems quite odd that Scalia would want to offer even a tentative
view about the validity of any types of laws without undertaking a
historical analysis of them, given that the Heller opinion otherwise
emphasizes so strongly the need for constitutional decisionmaking to
be supported by detailed historical analysis of original understandings
and traditional interpretations.
Some have speculated that the list of presumptively lawful regulations was not Justice Scalia’s idea, and that he included it in the opinion only because one of the other Justices on the majority side of the
case, such as Justice Anthony Kennedy, demanded it.56 In other
words, including the list of presumptively lawful measures may have
been a price that Justice Scalia had to pay in order to have his opinion
speak for a united majority of five Justices rather than a mere plurality
of four. Whether or not that sort of speculation is accurate, the fact
remains that the list is in the opinion, and so it is something with
which the lower courts must grapple as they try to decide how to implement the constitutional right addressed in Heller.57
Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 627 n.26.
54 Id. at 632.
55 Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1552 n.121 (2009).
56 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 419, 420 (2009) (claiming that these parts of the Heller opinion are “transparent add-ons”
that “were clearly tacked on to the opinion to secure a fifth vote (presumably Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s)”).
57 Cf. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2009) (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is presented as a reasoned interpretation of the law by a court, not as a political compromise, and I will leave others to speculate
about logrolling and secret deals.”).
52
53
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The problem, however, is that Scalia’s opinion does not give
lower courts any clear guidance about what to do with the list of presumptively lawful measures. The opinion does not spell out exactly
why certain types of laws, and not others, make the list. As a result,
“[e]xactly why these regulations are ‘presumptively lawful’ is obscure,
as is what might be sufficient to overcome the presumption.”58
The passage containing the list could be read as intended to have
no effect on future adjudication of Second Amendment claims. For
example, the list might be seen as nothing more than a reminder that
the Court was not deciding anything, one way or the other, about the
validity of the listed measures. But if that is all the Court meant to
say, it did a very poor job of making the point. The Court could have
simply inserted a footnote saying something along the lines of “we of
course do not decide today any issues not presented in the case before
us.”
At the other extreme, the Court’s opinion could be read as definitively establishing the constitutionality of the listed measures. In
other words, the Court refers to the list as containing “presumptively
lawful regulatory measures,”59 but some presumptions are conclusive
or irrebuttable.60 That reading of the passage draws support from the
Court’s statement that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to
cast doubt” on any of the listed measures.61 After all, a Second
Amendment claim would be in deep trouble if there truly was nothing
to support it in the most important Second Amendment ruling ever
made by the Supreme Court.
Of course, one could also read the Heller list of presumptively
lawful regulations in a variety of ways that fall somewhere in between
the weakest and strongest meanings that could be assigned to it. Perhaps the list essentially serves as a vague but helpful hint to lower
courts about what to do and as a form of foreshadowing to the public
about what to expect. Lower courts will need to assess the constitutionality of measures that fall within the list’s parameters rather than
simply taking for granted that the listed types of laws are valid. But in
embarking on that task, the lower courts should bear in mind that the
Tushnet, supra note 56, at 420 (footnote omitted).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
60 See James J. Duane, The Constitutionality of Irrebuttable Presumptions, 19 REGENT U.
L. REV. 149, 157 (2006) (“There is nothing unconstitutional, illegal, or even un-American about
irrebuttable presumptions. They have always abounded in our law.”).
61 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; see, e.g., People v. Delacy, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 223–24 (Ct.
App. 2011) (concluding that Heller’s language unambiguously requires courts to uphold all types
of laws on the list of presumptively valid regulations), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1092 (2012).
58
59
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types of laws on the list are the sorts of measures likely to pass constitutional muster. The Supreme Court thus might have simply felt it
was wise to give the lower courts a nudge in the right direction, lest
any judges get the wrong idea and rush off too rashly to invalidate a
broad swath of gun laws.
If the presumption of validity is not conclusive, that leads to significant questions about what exactly the lower courts should be looking for in analyzing the constitutionality of laws that fall within the
presumptively lawful categories. Heller does not clearly say, but it
strongly hints that the analysis should be deeply historical in nature.
Again, the list of presumptively lawful measures comes at the end of a
paragraph describing what Blackstone and other early commentators
had to say about limits on the right to keep and bear arms, as well as
noting how nineteenth-century courts upheld laws banning the carrying of concealed weapons.62 Continuing to emphasize history, the
Court uses the word “longstanding” to describe the types of laws on
the list of presumptively lawful regulations.63 Scalia did not specify
what it takes for a law to qualify as longstanding.64 But despite such
ambiguities, the inclusion of the word “longstanding” in that passage
seems deliberate and important given the opinion’s persistent focus on
historical sources and traditions as primary elements of constitutional
interpretation.
Perhaps the most illuminating clue that Scalia offers about all of
this comes later in the opinion, when he responds to the dissenting
Justices’ criticism of the puzzling nature of the list of presumptively
lawful regulatory measures. Scalia promises that “there will be time
enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions
we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.”65
Scalia thus seems to indicate that the types of laws on the list are not
entirely immune from constitutional attack. Instead, he anticipates
that there might well be plausible challenges made to them, some of
which may ultimately reach the Supreme Court. And according to
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
64 Id. The wording of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller was a little ambiguous as to
whether “longstanding” described only the laws concerning felons and the mentally ill, or
whether that word also applied to laws forbidding guns in sensitive places and laws regulating
commercial sale of arms. But Justice Alito’s opinion in McDonald seems to assume that “longstanding” describes every category of laws on the list, not just prohibitions on guns for felons and
the mentally ill. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (plurality
opinion).
65 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
62
63
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Scalia, the Supreme Court will apply a historical analysis to determine
the validity of the challenged laws in those cases.66
D. Declining to Specify the Level of Scrutiny or Other Test
Applicable to Second Amendment Claims
As for gun laws falling outside the list of presumptively lawful
regulations, the Heller opinion was equally enigmatic on the basic
question of how courts should decide what restrictions on guns violate
the right to keep and bear arms. The Court did make one thing clear:
Second Amendment claims cannot be subject to mere rational basis
scrutiny.67 Other constitutional principles, such as equal protection
and due process, already require that all government actions must
have a rational basis.68 If the Second Amendment merely required
that gun laws pass the same rational basis hurdle, it would be a redundant and pointless provision.69
The Court thus signaled that something more demanding than rational basis scrutiny should apply, but declined to specify exactly
whether strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or some other standard
should be used. An explanation for the Court’s failure to identify a
particular test for Second Amendment claims may be found in comments made by Chief Justice John Roberts during oral argument in
Heller. When the U.S. Solicitor General suggested that the Court
should apply intermediate scrutiny rather than a strict scrutiny test so
as not to jeopardize too many important gun laws, Roberts questioned
the need to assign the Second Amendment to any of the tiers of the
conventional framework for constitutional analysis:
Well, these various phrases under the different standards
that are proposed, “compelling interest,” “significant interest,” “narrowly tailored,” none of them appear in the Constitution; and I wonder why in this case we have to articulate an
all-encompassing standard. Isn’t it enough to determine the
scope of the existing right that the amendment refers to, look
at the various regulations that were available at the time, including you can’t take the gun to the marketplace and all
that, and determine how these—how this restriction and the
scope of this right looks in relation to those?
I’m not sure why we have to articulate some very intricate standard. I mean, these standards that apply in the First
66
67
68
69

See generally id.
Id. at 628 n.27.
Id.
Id.

2012]

JUSTICE BREYER’S TRIUMPH

717

Amendment just kind of developed over the years as sort of
baggage that the First Amendment picked up. But I don’t
know why when we are starting afresh, we would try to articulate a whole standard that would apply in every case?70
Consistent with Chief Justice Roberts’s skepticism about applying
a traditional standard of review, the Supreme Court in Heller opted to
refrain from establishing a formulaic test for Second Amendment
claims. The Court first addressed the scope of the right, concluding
that it extended beyond the activities of organized state militias and
finding that defense of the home against criminal attackers is at the
core of the right.71 The Court looked at various regulations of guns
that existed at the time of the Second Amendment’s adoption, such as
a law that prohibited having loaded firearms within buildings in Boston and laws in other cities that restricted the storage of gunpowder in
homes or prohibited the firing of guns within city limits.72 And in the
decisive part of the analysis, the Court compared the District of Columbia’s restrictions on guns to the historical evidence about the original scope of the right to keep and bear arms and traditional
understandings of that right and its limitations.73
Finding that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come
close to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban,” the
Court concluded that prohibiting the “quintessential self-defense
weapon” impermissibly infringed on the ability of citizens to defend
themselves in their homes.74 Likewise, the District’s requirement that
firearms in the home be kept unloaded and disassembled or locked
would make it “impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful
purpose of self-defense.”75 Regardless of any purposes or benefits
that these laws might have, they failed “[u]nder any of the standards
of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional
Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290).
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (concluding that “the inherent right of self-defense has been
central to the Second Amendment right”); id. at 630 (describing self-defense as the right’s “core
lawful purpose”); id. at 635 (finding that the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home”).
72 Id. at 631–34. Not strictly limiting itself to evidence predating the Second Amendment’s
adoption in 1791, the Court bolstered its assessment of the traditional meaning of the right to
keep and bear arms with citations to nineteenth-century state court decisions striking down laws
that prohibited open (i.e., nonconcealed) carrying of pistols. Id. at 629 (citing Nunn v. State, 1
Ga. 243, 251 (1846); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 187 (1871)).
73 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–31.
74 Id. at 629.
75 Id. at 630.
70
71
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rights.”76 The Court thus had no need to wade into fine distinctions
among various forms of intermediate or strict scrutiny, let alone get
bogged down in complex debates about the effects of and interests
served by the District’s guns laws, because the provisions at issue simply infringed far too much on the basic concept of self-defense that
the Court found enshrined within the Second Amendment.
E. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
The four Justices unconvinced by Scalia’s reasoning generated a
pair of dissenting opinions. Squarely disagreeing with the entire premise of the majority’s position, Justice John Paul Stevens disputed the
conclusion that the Second Amendment protects anything other than
organized militia activities.77 Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent, on the
other hand, focused on the application of the right to keep and bear
arms rather than its scope.78 In other words, assuming for the sake of
argument that the Second Amendment does protect a right to use
guns for personal self-defense, Justice Breyer argued that the District
of Columbia’s laws nevertheless should be upheld as reasonable and
appropriate regulations of that right.79
In contrast to the more historical and theoretical bent of Scalia’s
analysis, Breyer’s dissent took a pragmatic approach. Although
Breyer talked about historical evidence, particularly gun laws that existed in Boston and other major American cities during the Founding
era,80 he emphasized that historical evidence about the scope of the
right to keep and bear arms merely provided “the beginning, rather
than the end, of any constitutional inquiry.”81 To decide whether a
particular restriction on use of guns should be upheld “requires us to
focus on practicalities, the statute’s rationale, the problems that called
it into being, its relation to those objectives—in a word, the details.”82
In Breyer’s view, there can be “no purely logical or conceptual answers to such questions.”83 Instead, the analysis inevitably must boil
down to an “interest-balancing inquiry,” weighing the risks and beneId. at 628.
See id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he Second Amendment was
adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a wellregulated militia” and does not limit legislative authority to regulate private uses of firearms
such as for hunting or personal self-defense).
78 Id. at 681–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 681.
80 Id. at 683–86.
81 Id. at 687.
82 Id.
83 Id.
76
77
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fits at stake on each side of the controversy.84 A legal restriction may
reduce criminal or accidental misuse of guns, but it also may interfere
with beneficial use of guns for self-defense or other legitimate purposes. Do the potential benefits of a challenged regulation outweigh
the potential costs?
Breyer argued that because “any attempt in theory to apply strict
scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry,” the Court should simply go ahead and explicitly establish
an interest-balancing test for Second Amendment claims.85 Breyer
recognized that such a test would naturally take into account the degree of the burden that a challenged law imposed on those wanting
guns for lawful reasons, as well as the availability of alternative ways
that the government might pursue its safety interests while interfering
less with legitimate uses of guns.86 The ultimate question would be
whether a law “imposes burdens that, when viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate objectives, are disproportionate.”87
Breyer added one crucial caveat to his proposed approach. “In
applying this kind of standard,” Breyer observed, “the Court normally
defers to a legislature’s empirical judgment in matters where a legislature is likely to have greater expertise and greater institutional
factfinding capacity.”88 In other words, Breyer would not require governments to present detailed, absolute proof that a challenged law’s
benefits outweigh its detrimental effects. Instead, Breyer would have
judges merely inquire as to whether the legislature’s judgments were
reasonably based on substantial evidence.89 Where different conclusions could be drawn from the statistical data and other information
available, and experts disagree about the likely net effect of a gun
regulation, courts should respect legislators’ “primary responsibility
for drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact.”90
Turning to the specific laws at issue in the Heller case, Breyer
emphasized that the District of Columbia is an urban territory with
high crime rates and a particularly acute problem with handgun violence.91 Although reasonable minds could certainly disagree about
whether the District’s tight gun control laws alleviated or exacerbated
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 689.
at
at
at
at
at
at

689–90, 693.
693.
690.
702, 704.
704.
681–82, 714.
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that problem, Breyer would defer to elected officials’ choices about
what to do.92
Justice Scalia unequivocally denounced Breyer’s interest-balancing approach as a “judge-empowering” maneuver that could rob the
Second Amendment of any real meaning or effect.93 In Scalia’s view,
laws infringing the core right established by the Second Amendment
cannot be tolerated even if every legislator and judge in the country
wholeheartedly agrees that such laws would have significant positive
social effects.94 The constitutional protection of a right to keep and
bear arms “takes certain policy choices off the table,” regardless of
what virtues those policy choices might be expected to have.95
Scalia and Breyer thus offered two fundamentally different, competing visions of how courts should look at Second Amendment
claims. Breyer endorsed a highly pragmatic approach focused on assessing gun control laws from a contemporary public policy perspective, but with a potent dose of judicial restraint and a correspondingly
strong tilt toward upholding legislative determinations supported by
any reasonable amount of information and plausible reasoning. At
one point, Breyer argued that “practical wisdom” supported his position,96 and that phrase is a tidy encapsulation of the overall tenor of
his opinion. He essentially trusts that legislators will try to make sensible policy decisions about guns, and he advises judges to be cautious,
pragmatic, and open-minded about respecting those legislative decisions. By contrast, Scalia does not think that judges or politicians
have any business deciding what is wise with respect to matters already resolved by the Constitution. Although Scalia’s opinion in Heller never precisely articulates the framework for analysis that lower
courts should use in future cases, Scalia makes clear that the analysis
should be primarily historical in nature. For Scalia, the original meaning of the right and the traditional understandings that surrounded it
in early U.S. history cannot be trumped by the whims of contemporary cost-benefit policy analysis.
As Justice William Brennan reportedly quipped, “[T]he first rule
of the Supreme Court is that you have to be able to count to five.”97
Scalia, not Breyer, was able to garner five votes in Heller, and thus a
92
93
94
95
96
97

See id. at 719.
Id. at 634–35 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 691 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Abner Mikva, The Scope of Equal Protection, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 8.
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significant initial dispute about the Second Amendment was resolved.
For the first time, Supreme Court precedent clearly established that
Americans have a constitutional right to own and use guns that extends broadly beyond militia activities. Not surprisingly, the Court’s
decision drew a mixture of responses. As one newspaper aptly summarized, “The reaction broke less along party lines than along the divide between cities wracked with gun violence and rural areas where
gun ownership is embedded in daily life.”98 Gun rights advocates naturally lavished praise upon Scalia’s decision. For example, Professor
Randy Barnett described Scalia’s opinion as “historic in its implications and exemplary in its reasoning,” calling it “the clearest, most
careful interpretation of the meaning of the Constitution ever to be
adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court” and predicting that it
would be “studied by law professors and students for years to come.”99
Texas lawyer David Schenck, who filed an amicus brief in the Heller
case, had a similarly spirited but pithier response: “‘Hallelujah. Praise
the Lord and pass the ammunition.’”100
II.

THE SECOND BATTLE: MCDONALD V. CITY

OF

CHICAGO

While putting to rest some questions about the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller left other important issues unresolved. One of the most significant was whether state and
local government actions could violate the right to keep and bear
arms. The Second Amendment, like the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, applies only to the federal government.101 The Fourteenth
Amendment, however, applies to state and local governments and
prohibits them from depriving people of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.102 In a series of decisions starting in the late
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court decided that most rights secured against federal infringement by the Bill of Rights are so fundamentally important that they are part of what it means to receive due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The result is that
98 Chad Livengood, Court Affirms Gun Rights, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Mo.), June
27, 2008, at 1A.
99 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST.
J., June 27, 2008, at A13.
100 Todd J. Gillman, Rejection of Ban Triggers New Debate, DALL. MORNING NEWS, June
27, 2008, at 1A (quoting David Schenck, who filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Texas State
Rifle Association and sister groups in forty-two other states).
101 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 553 (1875).
102 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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important provisions of the Bill of Rights wind up being “incorporated” through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and
thereby restrain the actions of state and local governments as well as
the federal government.103
Heller involved laws of the District of Columbia, which is a special federal territory and not a state, so the Court did not need to
make a decision about incorporation in that case.104 But lower courts
would immediately face the incorporation question, as litigants
around the country began to challenge state and local gun restrictions.
Indeed, within fifteen minutes of the Supreme Court’s announcement
of the Heller ruling, the Illinois Rifle Association had filed a lawsuit
challenging the City of Chicago’s handgun ban,105 and the National
Rifle Association followed up with a similar suit of its own the next
day.106
The incorporation issue took a few years to wind its way through
the lower courts, but it eventually reached the Supreme Court in 2010
in McDonald v. City of Chicago. The Court split 5–4, just as in Heller,107 and once again the majority expanded gun rights.108 The five
Justices on the prevailing side could not completely agree on the rationale for their result. Never afraid to question seemingly well-settled
constitutional doctrine,109 Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the
Court should rethink its incorporation jurisprudence, recognize that it
had been using the wrong part of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate rights, and hold that the right to keep and bear arms enjoys
103 See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.2
(6th ed. 2000) (explaining the controversies surrounding incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the Fourteenth Amendment).
104 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 620 n.23 (2008) (noting that incorporation
of the right to keep and bear arms was “a question not presented by th[e] case”).
105 CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast June 26, 2008).
106 NRA Sues for Repeal of Bans in City, 3 Suburbs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 28, 2008, at 4.
107 One change in the Supreme Court’s lineup had taken place between the Heller and
McDonald decisions, with Sonia Sotomayor replacing David Souter, but that switch did not affect the results because both voted with the liberal or gun control side of these issues. See Heller,
554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020,
3088 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the story of how the incorporation issue affected
Sotomayor’s journey to the Supreme Court, see Allen Rostron, The Past and Future Role of the
Second Amendment and Gun Control in Fights over Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 3
NE. U. L.J. 123, 148–63 (2011).
108 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (Alito, J., opinion of the Court).
109 See KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS
281–82 (2004) (quoting Antonin Scalia as saying that Clarence Thomas “does not believe in stare
decisis, period. If a constitutional line of authority is wrong, he would say let’s get it right”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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protection through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause.110 The other four
Justices on the majority side, led by Justice Samuel Alito, preferred to
stick with the conventional route of incorporating through the Due
Process Clause.111 Again undertaking an in-depth exploration of
American history, this time focusing on the post–Civil War era, Alito’s
opinion concluded that those who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment considered the right to keep and bear arms to be fundamentally important to American liberty.112 Despite their differing
views about the proper mechanism of incorporation, the bottom line
was that once again a slim majority of the Supreme Court had resolved a major question about the right to keep and bear arms, concluding that the right applied fully to state and local governments
through the Fourteenth Amendment just as it binds the federal government through the Second Amendment.113
Indeed, the McDonald decision made it very clear that the right
would be exactly the same whether applied directly under the Second
Amendment or via incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. For many years, one of the controversies surrounding incorporation was whether an incorporated right must be treated exactly the
same—in other words, given the same scope, the same strength, the
same rules and requirements, the same exceptions, and so on—when
it applies to state and local governments through the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than to the federal government through the Bill of
Rights. Some Justices argued that rights can be tailored in various
ways and need not be applied in identical form to different levels of
government,114 while others insisted that a right must mean the same
thing in every instance regardless of whether it applies through incorporation.115 The Supreme Court eventually drifted toward the latter
view, sometimes described as the “jot-for-jot”116 or “one-size-fitsall”117 approach, declaring that it would be “incongruous to have dif110 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058–59 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
111

Id. at 3030–31 (plurality opinion).

Id. at 3036–42 (Alito, J., opinion of the Court).
Id. at 3026.
114 See id. at 3032 (citing examples). For more examples, see Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1557–62
(2005).
115 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 (citing examples).
116 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117 Rosen, supra note 114, at 1516.
112
113
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ferent standards” apply depending on which level of government infringed a right.118 Debate about the matter nonetheless persisted.119
In McDonald, Alito took the opportunity to emphatically slam
the door on any notion that analysis of the right to keep and bear
arms might differ depending on whether a case involved a federal,
state, or local government action. Alito read the Supreme Court’s
past decisions as “decisively”120 creating a “well-established rule that
incorporated Bill of Rights protections apply identically to the States
and the Federal Government”121 and rejecting “the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down,
subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.”122
The Supreme Court in McDonald thus made clear that a single,
uniform method of analysis will apply to gun laws at the federal, state,
and local levels. But once again, the Court failed to explain clearly
what that method of analysis should entail. Alito’s analysis of the incorporation question was primarily historical in nature,123 just like
most of Scalia’s analysis in Heller had been. Alito also pointed back
to Heller’s intriguing passage about specified types of longstanding
regulatory measures being presumptively constitutional, saying “[w]e
repeat those assurances here.”124 Chicago’s “doomsday proclamations” were misguided, Alito promised, because “incorporation does
not imperil every law regulating firearms.”125 But the Court shed no
new light on exactly how judges should go about sorting valid gun
laws from invalid ones. The Court, for example, did not talk about
levels of scrutiny or other forms of assessment that might be used to
apply the newly invigorated right to keep and bear arms.
Justice Breyer’s dissent in McDonald echoed themes from his
Heller dissent. History alone, he argued, is not a sound basis for con118

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).

See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52–53 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); Duncan, 391
U.S. at 181 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Rosen, supra note 114, at 1562–80 (discussing contemporary constitutional cases, including some majority opinions, reflecting a willingness to tailor constitutional rights for application to different levels of government).
119

120

McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035.

121

Id. at 3035 n.14.

Id. at 3047 (plurality opinion) (quoting Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10–11) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
122

123

See supra note 112 and accompanying text.

McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
626–27 (2008)); see supra Part I.C.
124

125

McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.
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stitutional decisionmaking.126 Judges instead must “consider the basic
values that underlie a constitutional provision and their contemporary
significance” as well as “the relevant consequences and practical justifications that might” warrant striking down or upholding a gun law.127
In other words, judges inevitably must approach gun rights claims as
matters of contemporary public policy, not just history, and weigh the
interests in personal safety and public safety at stake on each side.
Breyer suggested again that in balancing these interests, courts generally should defer greatly to legislative determinations about the risks
and benefits of various approaches to regulating guns.128 Determining
the effect of any particular gun law presents complex empirical questions that legislatures are better equipped than courts to handle.129
Again, Breyer essentially counsels pragmatism in McDonald, urging
that judges be attentive to the real consequences of different policy
choices about guns but deferential to reasonable legislative assessments.130 And just as in Heller, the Justices on the prevailing side of
the case flatly denied that Breyer’s brand of interest balancing should
have any role in adjudication of gun rights issues.131
III.

THE THIRD BATTLE: APPLYING THE RIGHT TO KEEP
BEAR ARMS IN THE LOWER COURTS

AND

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald opened
the way to a steady stream of litigation in lower courts about the right
to keep and bear arms. The development and refinement of this area
of law is of course likely to continue for many years, but an ample
body of decisions already exists. In some areas, the lower courts have
achieved strong consensus. In others, uncertainty still reigns, but
strong indications have nonetheless emerged about the directions in
which the courts seem likely to proceed.
A. Law-Abiding, Responsible Citizens
Even within a complex and evolving field like constitutional law,
some questions are easy to answer. Lower courts have faced little difficulty in applying the Supreme Court’s instruction that the right to
keep and bear arms should protect only those seeking to use guns for
See id. at 3122 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
128 See id. at 3135–36 (explaining how most state courts have long taken a “highly deferential attitude towards legislative determinations” about guns).
129 Id. at 3126–28.
130 See id. at 3126–27.
131 Id. at 3047, 3050 (plurality opinion).
126
127
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legitimate, lawful purposes, not those who would arm themselves to
commit dangerous crimes. For example, courts have flatly rejected
challenges to convictions under laws prohibiting the use of firearms in
furtherance of violent crimes or drug trafficking offenses.132 Rejecting
the argument of a defendant who claimed a right to protect himself
while distributing cocaine and other illegal drugs out of his home, one
opinion observed that “[t]he Constitution does not give anyone the
right to be armed while committing a felony, or even to have guns in
the next room for emergency use should suppliers, customers, or the
police threaten a dealer’s stash.”133 Courts have likewise consistently
rejected challenges to statutes providing stiffer punishment for crimes
committed with firearms.134 These sentencing enhancement provisions do not in any way infringe on the rights of law-abiding citizens,
and drawing this sort of categorical line to limit the scope of the Second Amendment makes good sense and has not sparked significant
controversy.135
B. Arms in Common Use at the Time
So far, lower courts also have had a fairly easy time implementing
the Supreme Court’s determination that only guns currently in common use fall within the scope of the constitutional right to keep and
bear arms.136 Following Justice Scalia’s lead,137 courts have briskly re132 See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 630 F.3d 1260, 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
319 (2011); Costigan v. Yost, 334 F. App’x 460, 462 (3d Cir. 2009); People v. Charles, No. 283452,
2009 WL 608404, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2009).
133 United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v.
Rush, 635 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (rejecting the idea that the Second Amendment “allows a person to insert himself intentionally into dangerous and illegal activity” and
then have his possession of a gun in conjunction with that activity treated with “kid gloves”).
134 United States v. Jacobson, 406 F. App’x 91, 93 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Goodlow, 389 F. App’x 961, 969 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. King, 333 F. App’x 92, 95–96 (7th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Rhodes, 322 F. App’x 336, 343 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009).
135 Courts have also begun to wrestle with other potential limits on the scope of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. For example, several courts have concluded that although
the Second Amendment protects those who seek to own and use guns, it does not apply to those
who wish to sell guns. See United States v. Chafin, 423 F. App’x 342, 344 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding
no authority “that remotely suggests that, at the time of its ratification, the Second Amendment
was understood to protect an individual’s right to sell a firearm”); Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n
v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 2010 WL 3926029, at *21–22 (D. Mont. Aug. 31) (findings
and recommendation of Magistrate Judge) (finding that the Second Amendment does not protect gun manufacturers or dealers), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 09-147-MDMW-JCL, 2010 WL 3909431 (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 2010). Others have ruled that the right to
keep and bear arms protects only U.S. citizens. See, e.g., United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No.
09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112, at *4–5 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010).
136 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008); see also supra Part I.B.
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jected challenges to the laws that impose special restrictions on machine guns138 and short-barreled shotguns.139 The opinions generally
contain no real analysis or discussion of this point, and instead they
simply assert that such weapons clearly are not in common use, as
though this is a self-evident fact.140
Even if they are reaching the right conclusions, the courts’ failure
to offer at least a bit more explanation for these conclusions is puzzling. Federal data suggest, for example, that there are about 400,000
legal machine guns in the hands of American civilians today,141 and
many people undoubtedly enjoy using them for recreational purposes.142 Again, Justice Scalia suggested during the Heller oral argument that “common use” means a much larger number, given the fact
that America’s population exceeds 300 million people,143 but a remark
by one Justice during oral argument is obviously not a particularly
solid basis for resolving a legal issue. Lower court judges may eventually provide a more thorough explanation for the conclusion that machine guns fall outside the Second Amendment’s scope, perhaps
See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 2426 (2010); United States v. McCartney, 357 F. App’x 73, 76 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Ross, 323 F. App’x 117, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383, 386
(9th Cir. 2008).
137
138

139 See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, 376 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Artez, 290 F. App’x 203, 208 (10th Cir. 2008); Gilbert, 286 F. App’x at 386; see also United
States v. Majid, No. 4:10cr303, 2010 WL 5129297, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 2010) (finding that
short-barreled AR-15 rifles are not commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes).
140 See, e.g., McCartney, 357 F. App’x at 76; United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th
Cir. 2008). Courts have also consistently rejected claims concerning more exotic items. See, e.g.,
McCartney, 357 F. App’x at 76 (silencers, grenades, and directional mines); United States v.
Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2009) (pipe bombs); People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d
576, 578–86 (Ct. App. 2009) (assault weapons and .50 caliber BMG rifles); Mack v. United
States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1235–36 (D.C. 2010) (ice picks); Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 943 N.E.2d 768,
780–81 (Ill. App. Ct.) (assault weapons), appeal allowed, 949 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2011); Lacy v.
State, 903 N.E.2d 486, 491–92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (switchblade knives).
141 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. I-2007-006, THE BUREAU
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES’ NATIONAL FIREARMS REGISTRATION
AND TRANSFER RECORD 2 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e0706/final.pdf. The federal data showed registrations for 391,532 machine guns as of November 2006.
Id. The number of registered machine guns is unlikely to increase significantly because a federal
law in place since 1986 prohibits the sale of new machine guns to anyone other than the military
and law enforcement agencies, while allowing machine guns already registered and possessed by
civilians to remain in circulation. See Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308,
§ 102(9), 100 Stat. 449, 452–53 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2006)).
OF

142 See, e.g., Ashley Lutz, Machine Gun Fun? Shoot Is ‘Stress Relief’ for Some, Anxiety
Source for Others, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), June 28, 2009, at B1.
143

See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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focusing on the fact that machine guns are not only unusual in a numerical sense but also unusually dangerous compared to other firearms.144 Assuming that 400,000 is insufficient, the question becomes
how many guns of a certain type must be owned in order to establish
common use. That should be an interesting and difficult issue for
courts to answer at some point in the future, but so far they have not
even scratched the surface of that question.145
Courts also have shown little interest in examining the potential
logical flaws in the common use requirement. For example, a plaintiff
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the federal ban on armor-piercing
ammunition insisted that rather than asking whether that type of ammunition is currently in common use for self-defense purposes, the
court instead should consider whether it would be commonly used in
the absence of the federal ban.146 This plaintiff had a reasonable
point, for it is oddly circular reasoning to say that a law banning an
item can justify itself because it prevents the item from being commonly used. The Fourth Circuit panel in that case nevertheless upheld
the ban, presuming that the use of armor-piercing ammunition would
not be common even without the ban “considering the great risk such
ammunition poses to law enforcement officers.”147
Other courts similarly have had little to say about the logic of the
common use requirement because in the end, that requirement produces appealing results.148 Judges know that public safety would be
unduly endangered if the Constitution guaranteed easy access to machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, armor-piercing ammunition, and the
like. Following Justice Scalia’s lead, they invoke the common use requirement and make what is ultimately a contemporary public policy
144 Scalia referred to the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and
unusual weapons.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
145 The D.C. Circuit has pointed out that courts need appropriate evidence to make decisions about what weapons are in common use. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), No.
10-7036, 2011 WL 4551558, at *13 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 2011) (finding that data in the record were
sufficient to establish that semiautomatic rifles and large-capacity ammunition magazines are in
common use in the United States today, but not to establish whether they are commonly used
for self-defense or hunting).
146

See Kodak v. Holder, 342 F. App’x 907, 908–09 (4th Cir. 2009).

147

Id. at 909.

For example, the defendant in United States v. Hatfield, 376 F. App’x 706 (9th Cir.
2010), argued that he had a right to keep and bear a sawed-off shotgun because it “resembles a
blunderbuss, a short-barreled, muzzle-loading firearm used around the time of the Second
Amendment’s ratification.” Id. at 707. The court summarily rejected that argument because
sawed-off shotguns are not typically possessed for lawful purposes today, regardless of how similar they may be to weapons popular two centuries ago. Id.
148
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determination look as though it emerges from a historical limitation of
the right’s scope.149
C. The List of Presumptively Lawful Regulatory Measures
More difficult issues have arisen over what to do about challenges
to the types of gun regulations characterized as “longstanding” and
“presumptively lawful” by Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller.150 Although it has only been a few years since the Heller decision, the
lower courts’ attitudes toward such claims have already undergone
substantial evolution. Much of the judicial discussion has concerned
the federal statute that prohibits possession of guns by convicted
felons.151 Although it still seems very likely that this law will escape
constitutional attack unscathed, the issue has revealed that the lower
courts simply do not really know what Heller instructed them to do.
As soon as the Heller decision was announced, the lower courts
faced an onslaught of challenges to the felon-in-possession statute.
Over and over, courts quickly brushed aside these claims by simply
citing the passage from Heller listing the presumptively lawful regulations.152 The question seemed that it might never receive greater attention until a Tenth Circuit judge, Timothy Tymkovich, objected to it
being so cavalierly dismissed.153 Judge Tymkovich pointed out that it
was not at all clear that banning felons from having guns was really a
“longstanding” practice after all.154 New scholarly research published
after the Heller decision suggested that laws banning felons from hav149 See Rostron, supra note 33, at 390–91 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s creation of the common use requirement “sacrifice[d] logical consistency and faithful reading of precedent in order
to construct an interpretation of the Second Amendment more in harmony with contemporary
public opinion”).
150 See supra Part I.C.
151 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
152 See, e.g., United States v. Brye, 318 F. App’x 878, 880 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Frazier, 314 F. App’x 801, 807 (6th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Irish,
285 F. App’x 326, 327 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383, 386 (9th Cir.
2008). Courts have reached the same conclusion about state laws prohibiting possession of guns
by convicted felons. See, e.g., People v. Valdovinos, No. F054871, 2009 WL 446122, at *6 (Cal.
Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2009); State v. Gatson, No. 284654, 2009 WL 2767199, at *5 n.4 (Mich. Ct. App.
Sept. 1, 2009). Courts have also rejected challenges to the federal law prohibiting possession of a
gun by a person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to
a mental institution.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); see, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 681 F. Supp. 2d
95, 103 (D. Me. 2010).
153 United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J.,
concurring).
154 Id. at 1048.
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ing guns were not enacted until the twentieth century, and therefore
no such laws existed in America at the time of the Second Amendment’s adoption.155 Tymkovich rightly noted that upholding felon-inpossession convictions based on an erroneous historical understanding
would be highly troubling given the overriding emphasis that Justice
Scalia placed on historical analysis in Heller.156 If history is what truly
matters most in constitutional interpretation, one’s historical analysis
surely needs to be accurate. Despite his misgivings, Judge Tymkovich
concluded that there was nothing he could do.157 In his view, the Heller list of presumptively lawful regulations was dictum, and perhaps
misguided dictum, but it nevertheless bound lower courts.158 The Supreme Court had said that nothing in Heller cast doubt on the validity
of laws disarming felons, and Tymkovich felt that he had to accept that
and move on.159
After Judge Tymkovich expressed his misgivings about relying on
the Heller list of presumptively lawful regulations, other judges began
to give the matter much more attention. Rather than simply assuming
that the Heller list conclusively established the validity of laws banning felons from having guns, some courts looked more carefully at
the extent of their obligation to follow dicta in Supreme Court opinions.160 Rather than broadly upholding felon-in-possession laws across
the board, some courts began to emphasize more heavily the factual
details of the cases before them, such as the nature of the felony convictions at issue, suggesting that distinctions might be drawn among
various categories of felons.161 As a Seventh Circuit decision ex155 See Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v.
Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1374 (2009); C. Kevin Marshall, Why
Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 698–714 (2009); Winkler,
supra note 16, at 1561, 1563. Earlier sources suggested that barring felons from having guns is
consistent with eighteenth-century understandings of the right to bear arms. See Robert Dowlut,
Commentary, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36
OKLA. L. REV. 65, 96 (1983); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning
of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 266 (1983).
156 McCane, 573 F.3d at 1048.
157 Id. at 1050.
158 Id. at 1047, 1050.
159 Id.
160 See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 171–73 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v.
Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3399 (2010); United States v.
Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 294 (2010); United States v.
Khami, 362 F. App’x 501, 508 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3345 (2010); People v. Davis, 947
N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 955 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. 2011).
161 See, e.g., Barton, 633 F.3d at 172–73 (finding that Heller requires courts to “presume”
that a felon gun dispossession law is valid, but implies that the presumption is rebuttable, and
therefore facial challenges to the law must be rejected but as-applied challenges may proceed);
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plained, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller “referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘presumptively lawful,’ which, by implication,
means that there must exist the possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.”162 The Third
Circuit hinted that perhaps a successful challenge could be brought by
a felon “convicted of a minor, non-violent crime” or “whose crime of
conviction is decades-old.”163
Some courts also began to explore further the historical justifications for excluding convicted felons from the Second Amendment’s
protection.164 As soon as judges embarked on this quest to dig more
deeply into history, they collided with the reality that history will not
provide clear answers to these sorts of questions.165 Although Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Heller characterized disarming felons as a longstanding tradition,166 federal law did not disqualify any felons from
possessing firearms until 1938 and did not disqualify nonviolent felons
until 1961.167 Of course, the power to disarm felons may have been
available all along, even if Congress did not exercise it until the twentieth century. Looking back to earlier days, some researchers find
that the original understanding of the Second Amendment was that
only “virtuous” citizens would have the right to keep and bear arms,
and felons did not qualify.168 Other studies find scant support for that

United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.) (recognizing that a federal ban on guns for
felons “may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its disqualification
of all felons, including those who are non-violent,” but that the defendant, as a violent felon, was
“not the ideal candidate” to make that argument), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 805 (2010); United
States v. Duckett, 406 F. App’x 185, 187 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., concurring) (suggesting that
courts should look more carefully at whether governments have a substantial interest in categorically prohibiting possession of guns by all nonviolent felons), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3081 (2011);
Khami, 362 F. App’x at 508 (noting that because the defendant had two prior drug felony convictions and was on electronic tether monitoring at the time he illegally possessed a firearm, he was
clearly within the category of felons for which gun possession could be prohibited without violating constitutional rights).
162

Williams, 616 F.3d at 692 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26

(2008)).
163

Barton, 633 F.3d at 174.

164

Id. at 173–74; Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1117–18.

Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118 (recognizing that “the historical question has not been definitively resolved”).
165

166

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.

167

Barton, 633 F.3d at 173.

Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
143, 146 (1986).
168
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conclusion.169 The scholarly research on the subject is therefore “inconclusive at best.”170
The historical evidence simply is too easy to spin in either direction. Some judges have been impressed, for example, by the fact that
Anti-Federalists at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in December 1787 proposed a constitutional amendment that would have created a right to keep and bear arms, expressly providing that “no law
shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for
crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.”171
This purportedly confirms that the Founding generation did not view
the common law right to keep and bear arms as protecting those likely
to commit crimes.172 But of course, one can just as easily wonder why
James Madison chose not to use the Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists’
language in the Second Amendment and speculate that if those who
wrote and approved the Second Amendment meant to exclude
criminals from the right to keep and bear arms, they would have said
so.173
With history providing no clear answers, courts ultimately decide
what to do about these issues based on assessments about sound public policy for modern-day America. Federal law seeks “to keep firearms out of the hands of violent felons, who the government believes
are often those most likely to misuse firearms,” and that is an unquestionably important goal.174 Statistics clearly show that convicted
felons are more likely than the average person to commit violent
crimes.175 Moreover, felony convictions often limit a person’s rights in
other respects, such as voting, so the idea that felons might be unable
to have guns does not seem odd or shocking.176
169

See supra note 155 (citing other sources on both sides of this debate).

United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011); accord United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681–82
(4th Cir. 2010).
170

171 THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 237, 240 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986).
172

Barton, 633 F.3d at 173.

Cf. Paul Finkelman, It Really Was About a Well Regulated Militia, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV.
267, 278–79 (2008) (discussing the peril of interpreting the Second Amendment based on proposed wording that “Madison and the First Congress clearly chose to utterly and totally ignore
and reject”).
173

174

United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 805 (2010).

175

Barton, 633 F.3d at 175.

176

Id.
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The U.S. government thus remains undefeated, so far, in overcoming Second Amendment challenges to the federal ban on gun possession by felons. Nevertheless, courts will continue to face the
issue,177 and it is certainly conceivable that a narrow attack based on
sympathetic facts could succeed, such as a claim asserted by a person
who was convicted long ago for a nonviolent felony, who has become
a model citizen, and who has a particularly pressing need to arm himself for self-defense.
Such an argument has already found success at the state constitutional level, albeit in a very limited way. In its 2009 decision in Britt v.
State,178 the Supreme Court of North Carolina carved out a small exception to the state law banning felons from having guns. The court
relied strictly on the North Carolina Constitution rather than invoking
federal constitutional rights.179 The case involved Barney Britt, who
pled guilty in 1979 to possessing drugs with the intent to sell.180 Several years after Britt completed his time in prison and probation, state
laws restored his right to have firearms, enabling him to lawfully own
guns from 1987 to 2004.181 Britt used his guns for hunting, on his own
land, and he never caused trouble of any sort.182 In 2004, however,
North Carolina’s legislature cracked down, enacting a new blanket
prohibition of firearms possession by felons.183 After dutifully surrendering his guns to the local sheriff, Britt filed a lawsuit challenging the
amended state law that retroactively disqualified him from continuing
to own and use firearms for hunting.184 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina concluded that the state’s new law was unreasonable as applied to Britt, a person who had a single conviction for a nonviolent
felony thirty years ago and who had subsequently demonstrated his
responsible and law-abiding character by safely and lawfully possess-

177 See, e.g., United States v. Pruess, 416 F. App’x 274, 275 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(remanding for the district court to analyze the constitutionality of a federal felon gun ban as
applied to a nonviolent felon).
178

Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009).

Id. at 322. The North Carolina Constitution has a provision containing language identical to that of the U.S. Constitution’s Second Amendment. Compare N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30,
with U.S. CONST. amend. II.
179

180

Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 321.

Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006) (providing that federal law will not bar a
convicted felon from possessing guns if the felon’s civil rights have been restored).
181

182

Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322.

183

Id. at 321.

184

Id. at 322.
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ing guns for seventeen years and then voluntarily turning them in to
the sheriff as soon as the law changed.185
The Britt decision is the exception that proves the rule. Far from
broadly opening the door to constitutional challenges to gun regulations, the North Carolina court created a narrow crevice just big
enough for an exceptionally sympathetic plaintiff to slip through.186
Very few litigants challenging gun laws will ever be able to show that
they are similarly situated to Barney Britt.187
Far less attention has been devoted so far in the lower courts to
the other items on Heller’s list of presumptively lawful regulations, but
they too may eventually pose similarly tricky questions. For example,
Heller referred to “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places, such as schools and government buildings.”188 Does
“schools” mean just school buildings or does it also include school
grounds or a one-thousand-foot zone around school property?189
Does it include public college and university campuses?190 Are all
government buildings “sensitive” or only some?191 Should the parking
lot of a government building be treated the same as the building itself?192 Aside from schools and government buildings, what other
places are “sensitive” enough to justify prohibitions of firearms?193
Id. at 322, 323.
Recognizing the narrowness of the court’s holding, the North Carolina legislature responded to Britt by revising its laws to provide a means by which a person convicted of a single
nonviolent felony can petition a court to have gun rights restored after a twenty-year period of
good behavior. See 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 108 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.4 (2010)).
Subsequent court decisions in North Carolina similarly confirm Britt’s very limited impact. See
State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 404–05 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting constitutional claim
where convicted felon could not establish all of the factors that supported the ruling in Britt),
aff’d, 700 S.E.2d 215, 219 (N.C.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3428 (2010).
187 For example, federal law has barred possession of guns by felons—even those convicted
of a single nonviolent crime—since 1961. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. That was
fifty years ago, making it unlikely that there will be many challengers to the federal law’s disqualification of nonviolent felons who can say that they lawfully and peaceably enjoyed the use
of guns for a substantial period of time before the 1961 enactment.
188 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
189 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(25), 922(q) (2006) (prohibiting possession of guns in school zones);
Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 WL 995933, at *2–5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (upholding state law prohibiting firearms in school zones).
190 See Digiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 370 (Va.
2011) (upholding regulation prohibiting possession of guns in university facilities and at campus
events).
191 See Aderinto v. Sessions, No. 3:08-2530-JFA-PJG, 2009 WL 2762514, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug.
26, 2009) (suggesting that a public library is a “sensitive place”).
192 See United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874, 875–76 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction for possession of a handgun in parking lot of a U.S. Postal Service facility).
193 See United States v. Davis, 304 F. App’x 473, 474 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming conviction
185
186
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For example, trying to decide whether churches are sensitive places, a
federal court in Georgia admitted that it was simply impossible to
know the answers to these types of questions because the Supreme
Court did not explain what it meant by using the phrase “sensitive
places.”194
Even once courts get past those line-drawing issues, they face the
same fundamental mystery that pervades the decisions about felon-inpossession laws. What was the Supreme Court trying to say with its
list of longstanding, presumptively lawful types of gun regulations?195
In other words, what are courts supposed to do when someone challenges the constitutionality of a law on the list? The Fourth Circuit
confronted this puzzling question in United States v. Masciandaro,196
where the defendant was convicted for having a loaded pistol while
sleeping in his car in a parking lot on national park property.197 In
response to Masciandaro’s assertion that he was exercising his right to
keep and bear arms, the government argued that a parking lot on national park property fits within Heller’s reference to “sensitive
places.”198 The Fourth Circuit panel in the case recognized that even
if it agreed that the parking lot in question was a sensitive place within
Heller’s meaning, that would simply “raise the question whether the
‘sensitive places’ doctrine limits the scope of the Second Amendment
or, instead, alters the analysis for its application to such places.”199
Heller thus could be read to mean that the Second Amendment does
not even apply to sensitive places, so any regulation of guns in those
places should be upheld automatically. But of course that would be
just one of many possible ways of reading the Supreme Court’s enigmatic listing of the presumptively lawful regulatory measures.200 After
describing this quandary in which Heller had put the lower courts, the
Fourth Circuit panel essentially ducked the question by concluding
that it was unnecessary to figure out what to make of Heller’s reference to “sensitive places” because Masciandaro’s conviction should be
upheld regardless of whether he possessed a gun in a sensitive place.201
for possession of handgun on airplane); People v. Ferguson, No. 2008QN036911, 2008 WL
4694552, at *4 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Oct. 24, 2008) (finding that an airport is a “sensitive place”).
194 Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1317, 1319 (M.D. Ga. 2011).
195 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
196 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011).
197 Id. at 460.
198 Id. at 471.
199 Id. at 472.
200 See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
201 Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 473.
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The bottom line, according to the court, was that the government had
sound reasons for regulating guns in “a national park area where large
numbers of people, including children, congregate for recreation.”202
Although lawyers and judges could carry on an endless and abstract
game of dissecting and speculating about the meaning of Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Heller, the concrete conclusion at the end of it all
must be that courts should uphold “reasonable measures to secure
public safety.”203
That attitude runs throughout the decisions that lower courts
have been making since Heller. As a theoretical matter, judges remain baffled by the Supreme Court’s inscrutable declaration that
some longstanding types of gun laws are presumptively constitutional.
But when it comes to actually resolving cases, judges consistently have
been making sensible choices based on practical considerations.
D. Beyond the List of Presumptively Lawful Regulatory Measures
While struggling to figure out what to make of the Supreme
Court’s list of presumptively valid regulatory measures, lower courts
have also faced a flood of constitutional challenges to gun laws not
included on that list. Heller mentioned longstanding prohibitions of
gun possession for felons and the mentally ill,204 but federal laws impose a variety of other restrictions. Illegal aliens are not allowed to
possess guns.205 The same goes for people who unlawfully use or are
addicted to drugs.206 Federal laws also prohibit possession of a gun by
a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence207 or who is the subject of a domestic violence restraining order.208 Although federal law sets no minimum age for possession of
rifles and shotguns, it generally prohibits handgun possession until the
202

Id.

203

Id.

204

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2006). With some exceptions, federal law also prohibits possession of guns by legal aliens with nonimmigrant visas, such as tourists, students, and temporary
workers. Id. § 922(g)(5)(B). Some states have historically imposed special restrictions that apply even to legal aliens who are permanent U.S. residents. See, e.g., Washington v. Ibrahim, No.
28756-4-III, 2011 WL 5084790, at *4–5 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2011) (concluding that a Washington statute, which was repealed several months after the defendant’s arrest, violated equal
protection rights by requiring lawful permanent resident aliens to register all firearms).
205

206

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).

207

Id. § 922(g)(9).

208

Id. § 922(g)(8).
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age of eighteen.209 Many other restrictions on guns can be found in
various federal, state, and local laws.210
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald invited
constitutional challenges to these laws but did not provide a clear
framework for lower courts to use in evaluating those challenges.
Again, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller emphasized the importance of
historical analysis but did not explain in greater detail how lower
courts should proceed.211 In particular, Heller did not identify a particular level of scrutiny or standard that should be used, other than to
rule out rational basis scrutiny and Justice Breyer’s proposed interestbalancing approach.212 Chief Justice Roberts’s comments during oral
argument suggested that he thought that the conventional formulas
for applying constitutional rights, like intermediate scrutiny and strict
scrutiny, would be unnecessary in the Second Amendment setting because a more historically oriented approach would be used.213 The
Heller opinion seemed to reflect Roberts’s suggestion,214 but it also
briefly mentioned that the District of Columbia’s gun laws could not
withstand any form of intermediate or strict scrutiny.215 The Court
thus avoided making any commitments about use of the familiar formulas of heightened scrutiny but also did not entirely disavow them.
In short, the Supreme Court provided an intriguing stew of different
signals, rather than a single clear recipe, for lower courts taking on the
work of implementing the right to keep and bear arms. Not surprisingly, lower courts have found this task to be quite a challenge, and
they have taken a number of different approaches to handling it.
Many state courts have simplified matters by essentially declaring
that they will not strike down any law that is not clearly rendered
invalid by Heller and McDonald. In other words, these courts strictly
construe the Supreme Court’s decisions as having established only
that the right to keep and bear arms can be violated by severe restric209 Id. § 922(x)(2). Selling a handgun to a person under the age of eighteen is also a federal
crime. Id. § 922(x)(1). Sellers who are federally licensed gun dealers are subject to additional
restrictions: they cannot sell rifles and shotguns to customers under the age of eighteen and they
cannot sell handguns to those under the age of twenty-one. Id. § 922(b)(1).
210 See, e.g., LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA: AN
EVALUATION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL, STATE AND SELECTED LOCAL GUN
LAWS (2008), available at http://www.lcav.org/publications-briefs/reports_analyses/RegGuns.entire.report.pdf.
211 See supra notes 65, 71–73 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 67–69, 93–95 and accompanying text.
213 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
215 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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tions on law-abiding citizens’ use of guns for self-defense in the
home.216 If the Supreme Court wants to go beyond that, the state
courts insist, “it will need to say so more plainly.”217 The states218
where courts have adopted this approach include California,219 Illinois,220 Kansas,221 Maryland,222 Massachusetts,223 New Jersey,224 and
See infra notes 218–25 (citing cases).
Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md.), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011); see also
Crespo v. Crespo, 972 A.2d 1169, 1179 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (concluding that a state
law prohibiting possession of a gun by a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order
would be upheld as a “valid, appropriate and sensible” limitation on gun rights “[a]bsent a clear
and binding announcement from the Supreme Court of the United States to the contrary”),
aff’d, 989 A.2d 827 (N.J. 2010).
218 In addition to the state court decisions, District of Columbia courts have adopted this
narrow interpretation of the principle established by Heller. See, e.g., Wooden v. United States,
6 A.3d 833, 840 (D.C. 2010) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge where use of a weapon
was “not at all the home-defense scenario contemplated in Heller”); Daniels v. United States, 2
A.3d 250, 253 n.2 (D.C.) (“[I]t is not obvious that Heller’s reach extends beyond cases of handgun possession in the home.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 806 (2010).
219 See, e.g., People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 808 (Ct. App. 2008) (upholding state ban
on carrying a loaded firearm in public because the statute contains exceptions for self-defense,
and therefore “there can be no claim that [the statute] in any way precludes the use ‘of handguns
held and used for self-defense in the home’ ” (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 636 (2008))); People v. Yarbrough, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, 682 (Ct. App. 2008) (upholding
state ban on carrying a concealed firearm without a permit because this law “does not broadly
prohibit or even regulate the possession of a gun in the home for lawful purposes of confrontation or self-defense, as did the law declared constitutionally infirmed in Heller”).
220 See, e.g., People v. Williams, No. 1-09-1667, 2011 WL 6351861, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec.
15, 2011) (upholding state ban on carrying a loaded gun outside one’s residence or business
because “both Heller and McDonald made clear that the only type of firearms possession they
were declaring to be protected under the second amendment was the right to possess handguns
in the home for self-defense purposes”); People v. Ross, 947 N.E.2d 776, 784 (Ill. App. Ct.),
appeal denied, 949 N.E.2d 1102 (Ill. 2011).
221 See State v. Knight, 241 P.3d 120, 133 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (upholding a state law
forbidding unlicensed possession of a concealed firearm because the Supreme Court in Heller
clearly “was drawing a narrow line regarding the violations related solely to use of a handgun in
the home for self-defense purposes”).
222 See Williams, 10 A.3d at 1177 (upholding state law requiring a permit to carry a handgun in public because the gravamen of Heller and McDonald was possession of firearms in the
home).
223 See Commonwealth v. McCollum, 945 N.E.2d 937, 954 (Mass. App. Ct.) (upholding
state law banning possession of ammunition without a license because defendant had the ammunition in a place other than his home), review denied, 953 N.E.2d 720 (Mass. 2011).
224 See State ex rel. J.M.K., No. FJ-18-984-09, 2011 WL 2412600, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. May 25, 2011) (upholding laws prohibiting possession of defaced firearm and possession of
handgun by person under twenty-one years of age because neither of these statutes “has the
absolutist impact that led to the [Supreme] Court striking down the District of Columbia law” in
Heller); In re Downing, 2011 WL 1532541, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 25, 2011) (per
curiam) (upholding a law requiring applicants to show “justifiable need” for a permit to carry a
handgun in public because the law “does not ban or restrict in any way the use of handguns or
216
217
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New York.225 It is surely no coincidence that, with the exception of
Kansas, these are deeply “blue” (i.e., liberal) states that rank in the
top ten on lists of states with the strictest gun laws and the lowest rates
of firearm ownership.226
Federal courts generally have not assumed that Heller and McDonald may be read so narrowly, and therefore they have been forced
to struggle with the difficult question of how to apply the right to keep
and bear arms to the many types of gun laws not mentioned in the
Supreme Court’s decisions. One of the first strategies that emerged
was to analyze challenged gun laws by way of comparison or analogy
to the Heller list of presumptively valid regulatory measures. For example, the federal district court in Maine pioneered this approach in
United States v. Booker,227 where the defendant challenged a federal
statute banning a person with a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction from possessing a gun.228 Rather than tackling the broader
“complex and unanswered question” of whether strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny should apply, the court decided that a more “useful approach” would be to look at how the law in question stacks up
against Heller’s list of presumptively valid measures.229 In other
words, is a law that prohibits people who have committed misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing guns sufficiently
similar to a law that prohibits convicted felons from possessing guns,
such that the former deserves the same presumption of validity given
to the latter in Heller? The judge in Booker found that the ban for
domestic violence misdemeanants is, if anything, even more precisely
tailored to reducing risks of gun violence than the felon disqualification provision.230 Although some felonies are nonviolent, every crime
of domestic violence involves the use, attempted use, or threatened
firearms within the home such as those statutes deemed unconstitutional” in Heller and
McDonald).
225 See, e.g., People v. Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 2009) (upholding state ban
on possession of a handgun without a license because the defendant was not in his home at the
time of the crime and this law “does not effect a complete ban on handguns”).
226 See BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 2010 STATE RANKINGS, BRADY
CAMPAIGN 2010 SCORECARDS (2010), available at http://www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/
stateleg/scorecard/2010/2010_Brady_Campaign_State_Scorecard_Rankings.pdf; LEGAL CMTY.
AGAINST VIOLENCE, GUN LAWS MATTER: A COMPARISON OF STATE FIREARMS LAWS AND STATISTICS 3 (2010), available at http://www.lcav.org/Gun_Laws_Matter/Gun_Laws_Matter_Brochure.pdf.
227 United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Me. 2008), aff’d, 644 F.3d 12, 14 (1st
Cir. 2011).
228 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006); Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 162.
229 Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
230 Id. at 164.
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use of violence.231 If the Second Amendment will tolerate a gun ban
for felons, the Booker court reasoned, then surely the same conclusion
must apply to the ban for domestic violence misdemeanants because
that category of offenders squarely implicates the government’s goal
of reducing risks of firearm misuse.232
That reasoning makes perfect sense if one assumes that the Heller
list of presumptively valid laws is essentially based on judgments
about what would be good public policy. In other words, if the underlying logic of the list is that certain types of gun laws are constitutional
because they promote public safety, then banning guns for domestic
violence misdemeanants seems just as prudent as prohibiting guns for
all felons. Indeed, Congress enacted the prohibition on gun possession for domestic violence misdemeanants to close a loophole in and
better achieve the policy goals of the felon dispossession law. Congress observed that, in some instances, the difficulties of prosecuting
domestic violence cases led to serious abusers being convicted of only
misdemeanor assault charges rather than felonies, and Congress
wanted the prohibition of firearms to extend to such cases.233 Seen in
that light, the federal ban on guns for domestic violence misdemeanants is really a closely connected component of the felon gun ban, like
a patch stitched in to close a hole in fabric.
That is not, of course, the only plausible way to view the Heller
list of presumptively valid types of laws. If qualifying for that list has
more to do with a law’s historical pedigree than its public policy implications, the basis for analogizing domestic violence misdemeanants to
felons might be much weaker. The statutory provision disqualifying
people with domestic violence misdemeanors from having guns is a
relatively new development, having been enacted by Congress in
1996.234 The federal gun ban for felons is substantially older,235 and
See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(A)(ii) (defining “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence”)).
232 Id. For examples of other cases using a similar approach of drawing analogies or comparisons to the Heller list of presumptively lawful regulations, see United States v. White, 593
F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Smith, 742 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862–63 (S.D. W.
Va. 2010); People v. Villa, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 463, 467–68 (Ct. App. 2009); and People v. Flores, 86
Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 807 (Ct. App. 2008). For a particularly far-reaching example of this approach,
see People v. Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301–02 (App. Div. 2011) (upholding state law banning
gun possession by person with any misdemeanor conviction).
233 See United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (2009); United States v. Booker, 644
F.3d 12, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 2010) (en
banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011).
234 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-371 (1996).
231
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the notion of excluding felons from the right to keep and bear arms at
least arguably might date back centuries to before the Constitution
came into existence.236 If longstanding tradition is the key common
characteristic of the items on the Heller list, modern legal innovations
like the ban on guns for domestic violence misdemeanants, however
much they may reduce risks and benefit society, do not qualify.
The lower courts have thus faced fundamental questions about
whether analysis of Second Amendment claims should be driven more
by historical inquiries or contemporary public policy considerations.
Some judges opted to head down the historical path. A quintessential
example was the First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rene E.,237
which upheld the constitutionality of the federal ban on juvenile possession of handguns.238 Rather than trying to evaluate the importance
of the government’s reasons for restricting juvenile access to handguns, the court undertook a strictly historical analysis and found a
longstanding tradition supporting the challenged enactment.239 While
noting that federal law did not impose any age restrictions on access
to firearms until 1968 and did not prohibit juvenile possession of
handguns until 1994,240 the court found evidence of a longer tradition,
stretching back to the latter half of the nineteenth century, of state
laws restricting minors’ possession of guns and other weapons such as
knives.241
As for the era in which the Constitution was written and adopted,
the available evidence was far less specific or enlightening. The court
in Rene E. cited no primary sources from the eighteenth century or
even the first half of the nineteenth century, such as laws, judicial decisions, treatises, or other writings, addressing the issue of juvenile access to guns. The closest that the court came to offering evidence
about the Founders’ attitudes was to quote a modern law review article suggesting that the Founding generation saw the right to keep and
bear arms as extending only to “virtuous” citizens and regarded children as being “incapable of virtue.”242
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155, 168 and accompanying text.
237 United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009).
238 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (2006); see supra note 209 and accompanying text. The court in
Rene E. emphasized that the federal statutes contain several exceptions allowing juvenile use of
handguns, for example, for self-defense in the home or for hunting or target practice with a
parent’s consent. Rene E., 583 F.3d at 12, 13–14 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(3)(D)).
239 Rene E., 583 F.3d at 13–16.
240 Id. at 13.
241 Id. at 14–15.
242 Id. at 15 (citing Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62
235
236
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When one digs underneath that article to examine its sources, the
historical evidence is limited but interesting and ambiguous. Juveniles
had no right to have guns in the Founding era, the historical argument
goes, until they were eligible for militia service.243 But the obligation
to serve in a militia, including the duty to possess arms, began at the
age of fifteen, sixteen, or eighteen, depending on the colony.244 Indeed, half a million soldiers in the Civil War were sixteen or younger,
and even today seventeen-year-olds can join the military with their
parents’ permission.245
One could therefore argue that the historical evidence actually
cuts sharply against the First Circuit’s conclusion in Rene E. that the
Founding generation would have approved a law preventing people
from possessing handguns until the age of twenty-one. As often happens, the answers that one derives from this sort of historical inquiry
depends greatly on the level of generality of the questions asked.246 If
history proves that the Founding Fathers accepted the general idea of
age restrictions on access to guns, perhaps that is all that should really
matter, and the Founders’ more specific beliefs about an appropriate
age limit should be ignored because times have changed since the
eighteenth century. Although the Founders may have drawn a line at
fifteen or sixteen in contrast to the line that exists today at eighteen or
twenty-one, the crucial point is simply that the Founders approved of
drawing lines based on age. On the other hand, once judges have a
license to overlook aspects of original or longstanding traditional understandings that do not square well with modern realities and needs,
the historical approach to defining constitutional rights starts to look
suspiciously inconsistent and susceptible to manipulation. Although
the First Circuit’s opinion in Rene E. thus purports to employ the hisTENN. L. REV. 461, 480 (1995)). The Rene E. opinion offered quotations from several other law
review articles discussing the Founding-era tradition of prohibiting gun possession by categories
of people posing a particular danger to the public, but none specifically addressed age restrictions. See id. at 15–16. The court also acknowledged that historians disagree about the extent to
which the Founders actually saw “virtue” as a limit on gun rights. Id. at 16.
243 See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 265 n.258 (1983).
244 Id. at 215 n.46.
245 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2006); see State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995, 1006–08 (Wash. 2010) (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (arguing that strict scrutiny should apply to age restrictions on gun possession because “[i]f a soldier is old enough to fight for the nation, he is old
enough to enjoy the fundamental right to keep and bear arms”).
246 The importance and difficulty of selecting the right level of generality in drawing conclusions about constitutional provisions and historical evidence has been extensively discussed in
the literature on originalism. See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment,
33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 950–54 (1998).
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torical methodology endorsed by the Supreme Court in Heller and
McDonald, it ultimately winds up illustrating how historical evidence
is often indeterminate. It can be readily spun in various directions,
depending on what conclusion a court ultimately wants to reach.247
Courts attempting to imitate the Supreme Court’s historical approach have encountered problems even on basic points like what
time period is most relevant for determining the original meaning of
the right to keep and bear arms when it applies to state and local laws
through the Fourteenth Amendment. At least one court opinion, issued by a Seventh Circuit panel in Ezell v. City of Chicago,248 has proposed that the relevant time frame depends on the level of
government involved. To determine the scope of the right to keep and
bear arms for challenges to federal government action, judges should
look to the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification (i.e., around
1789 to 1791).249 But for challenges to state or local laws, “the focus of
the original-meaning inquiry is carried forward” to the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption (i.e., circa 1866 to 1868).250 That
seems logical if one believes that the goal of constitutional interpretation is to determine what the relevant constitutional provision meant
at the time of its adoption, but it flies directly in the face of the Supreme Court’s very clear rejection of such a “two-track approach” to
rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.251 The Supreme Court strongly emphasized in McDonald that
the right to keep and bear arms must be enforced against state and
local governments according to exactly the same standards that protect the right against federal infringement.252 And yet, the scope and
strength of the right cannot be exactly the same for all levels of government, as McDonald demands, if courts assess federal actions based
on the right’s meaning in the late eighteenth century when the Second
Amendment was born, but evaluate state and local actions based on
247 Litigation concerning New York City’s ban on possessing air pistols provides another
example. A judge in People v. Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d 801, 809–11 (Sup. Ct. 2011), concluded that
air-powered guns are not arms within the Second Amendment’s meaning, even though the defendant presented historical evidence that Meriwether Lewis, during his famed expedition westward with William Clark, used an air rifle “for hunting and to astonish native Americans.” Id. at
811 (internal quotation marks omitted). The judge deemed that evidence insufficient because it
did not mention the use of air guns for self-defense. Id.
248 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
249 Id. at 701–02.
250 Id. at 702.
251 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048 (2010) (plurality opinion).
252 Id. at 3035 (Alito, J., opinion of the Court); see also id. at 3048 (plurality opinion); see
supra notes 114–22 and accompanying text.
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what the right meant several generations later when the Fourteenth
Amendment arrived on the scene.
Rather than deal with these sorts of problems and stick with an
exclusively or even predominantly historical approach, most courts
have gravitated in a direction that brings them onto very familiar terrain. Courts have essentially returned to the three tiers of scrutiny
used to analyze laws allegedly infringing equal protection and some
other constitutional rights. Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion for the
en banc Seventh Circuit in United States v. Skoien253 has quickly
emerged as one of the most influential explications and applications of
this approach.
Like many of the other Second Amendment cases decided in recent years,254 Skoien involved a conviction under the federal law
prohibiting people convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms.255 Chief Judge Easterbrook’s opinion
began by deftly cutting through much of the tangle of confusion generated in the lower courts by Heller’s more ambiguous pronouncements, particularly its listing of longstanding and presumptively valid
regulations.256 “We do not think it profitable,” Chief Judge Easterbrook observed, “to parse these passages of Heller as if they contained
an answer” to questions like the validity of the ban on domestic violence misdemeanants having firearms.257 The lower courts, in Easterbrook’s view, had been trying to read too much into the Supreme
Court’s “cautionary language” intended merely to warn readers not to
treat Heller as deciding more than it really did.258
Chief Judge Easterbrook’s opinion likewise swiftly shot down the
idea that Second Amendment cases should turn on crude historical
assessments of what legal restrictions on guns are sufficiently “longstanding” or traditional.259 As an example, Easterbrook noted that
federal law did not disqualify violent felons from having guns until
1938 and did not expand that prohibition to nonviolent felons until
253 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1674 (2011).
254 See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. White,
593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010).
255 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 639; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).
256 See Richard A. Epstein, NRA v. City of Chicago: Does the Second Amendment Bind
Frank Easterbrook?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 997, 997 (2010) (describing Chief Judge Easterbrook’s
opinions as “always a pleasure to read—short and incisive, without pointless verbiage”).
257 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 640–41.
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1961.260 Is a law enacted in 1938 longstanding? Easterbrook said it
depends on how one looks at it: “A 1938 law may be ‘longstanding’
from the perspective of 2008, when Heller was decided, but 1938 is 147
years after the states ratified the Second Amendment.”261 More important, a law’s constitutionality should not depend on whether it is
longstanding. It would be “weird,” Chief Judge Easterbrook bluntly
noted, to suggest that the federal law disarming domestic violence
misdemeanants is unconstitutional now, but will become constitutional when it has been around long enough to qualify as
longstanding.262
Chief Judge Easterbrook argued that Heller’s list of presumptively valid measures teaches an important lesson, but the lesson is not
that gun laws must be old to be constitutional.263 The Heller list instead simply demonstrates that legislatures can impose categorical
limitations on gun possession without violating any constitutional
rights.264 Specified categories of individuals can be prohibited from
having guns without the government being required to present evidence on a case-by-case basis proving that each member of the affected class really deserves to be disarmed.265 Moreover, the
categories of individuals prohibited from having guns today “need not
mirror limits that were on the books in 1791.”266 Rather than locking
in whatever specific beliefs about sound gun policy were prevalent in
1791, the Second Amendment wisely “leav[es] to the people’s elected
representatives the filling in of details.”267
After explaining how not to decide Second Amendment cases,
Chief Judge Easterbrook concluded that courts simply should require
some form of “strong showing” that a law is substantially related to an
important governmental objective.268 This is, Easterbrook noted,
what many opinions call “intermediate scrutiny,” although Easterbrook expressed reluctance to unnecessarily wade “more deeply into
the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.”269 Applying this standard, Easterbrook concluded that the federal ban on guns for domestic violence
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269

Id. at 640; see supra note 167 and accompanying text.
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 640–41.
Id.
Id. at 641.
Id.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 641–42.
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misdemeanants easily passes constitutional muster because of the simple fact that people who have been violent in the past are more likely
to be violent again in the future.270 Easterbrook cited a variety of social science sources to support his conclusions, including data showing
that a domestic assault is more likely to be lethal if the attacker uses a
firearm271 and that domestic abusers have high rates of recidivism.272
In short, someone convicted for a domestic violence crime—regardless of whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor—is apt to act
violently again, and that violence is more likely to be deadly if the
attacker wields a gun.
Chief Judge Easterbrook’s version of intermediate scrutiny is not
a particularly demanding one. Although courts sometimes refer to intermediate scrutiny as though it is a single or unitary standard,273 a
judge purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny actually has a variety
of options for how to proceed.274 Professor Eugene Volokh noted this
in his influential article on implementing the right to keep and bear
arms, explaining how the consequences of courts applying heightened
scrutiny to gun laws will depend greatly on how judges evaluate empirical claims about the likely effects those laws have on public
safety.275 The most demanding judge might require “substantial scientific proof that a law will indeed substantially reduce crime and injury.”276 A less exacting approach would be “to simply require a
logically plausible theory of danger reduction.”277 In Volokh’s view,
the former approach would lead courts to strike down virtually every
gun law, because scientific studies have never absolutely proven (or
Id. at 642–44.
Id. at 643–44.
272 Id. at 644.
273 Cf. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 802 (describing how courts tend to synthesize various distinct doctrines into a “single, overarching standard” of intermediate scrutiny for
First Amendment purposes).
274 See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97–98 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting various articulations of the intermediate scrutiny standard in freedom of speech cases), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 958 (2011); Kimberly J. Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of
Public Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary Schools, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1953, 1997
(2006) (observing that, in equal protection cases, “intermediate scrutiny currently is sufficiently
indeterminate that the only thing consistent about it is that it is inconsistently interpreted and
applied”); David A. Herman, Note, Juvenile Curfews and the Breakdown of the Tiered Approach
to Equal Protection, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1857, 1883 (2007) (“There is a lot of space between strict
and rational review, and ‘intermediate scrutiny’ does not mean the same thing in all contexts.”).
275 Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1467–70 (2009).
276 Id. at 1467.
277 Id. at 1468.
270
271
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disproven) the effectiveness of these laws, while the latter attitude
would lead to everything being upheld because there is a plausible
argument to be made on behalf of virtually any gun control
measure.278
Chief Judge Easterbrook’s approach in Skoien falls somewhere
between the possibilities that Volokh described, but closer to the less
demanding end of the spectrum. Chief Judge Easterbrook certainly
cites social science studies and data, and those sources provide strong
reasons to think that the ban on gun possession for domestic violence
misdemeanants may be a very valuable law.279 But do they conclusively prove that America is a safer place because of this law? The
research that exists simply is not capable of proving that one way or
the other.280 The missing key piece of information is the extent to
which the gun ban actually has its intended effect of reducing the odds
that a domestic abuser will have and use a gun. Chief Judge Easterbrook logically assumes that the ban reduces, at least to some significant extent, the number of guns that are used in domestic assaults.281
And under Chief Judge Easterbrook’s version of intermediate scrutiny, that logically plausible theory about how the law will work is
enough to sustain the law.282
One member of the Seventh Circuit, Judge Diane Sykes, dissented from Easterbrook’s opinion, and her views offer a glimpse of
what a somewhat more demanding form of judicial scrutiny of gun
laws might entail.283 Judge Sykes complained that most of the empirical data mentioned in Chief Judge Easterbrook’s opinion came from
Id. at 1468, 1470.
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1674 (2011). Chief Judge Easterbrook’s approach is thus consistent with that of courts
emphasizing that a challenged law must be supported by “sufficient evidence” that the law has a
substantial relationship to an important government objective, not just “plausible reasons” why
the law may have beneficial effects. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010).
280 Professor Mark Tushnet has extensively discussed the difficulty of proving the effectiveness of gun control laws through social science evidence. See MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF
RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 85–102 (2007).
281 See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 643.
282 For a later example of the Seventh Circuit’s approach, see United States v. Yancey, 621
F.3d 681, 683, 686 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding the federal ban on gun possession by habitual drug
users and citing evidence that showed a general link between drug use and violent crime but did
not conclusively establish the challenged law’s effectiveness).
283 See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 645 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Judge Sykes wrote the initial appellate decision in Skoien for a unanimous three judge panel. That opinion was vacated when the
Seventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc. See United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir.
2009), reh’g en banc granted and vacated, No. 08-3770, 2010 WL 1267262 (7th Cir. Feb. 22), aff’d
on reh’g en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011).
278
279
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the court’s own research, rather than from the government.284 “This is
an odd way,” Judge Sykes jabbed, “to put the government to its burden of justifying a law that prohibits the exercise of a constitutional
right,”285 and it “deprives Skoien of the opportunity to review the outcome-determinative evidence, let alone subject it to normal adversarial testing.”286 Worried that the court’s understanding of the social
science research might be mistaken,287 Judge Sykes argued that the
court should have remanded the case to the district court and put the
onus on the government to “shoulder its burden” of proving how the
challenged law actually advances important interests.288
Other courts have begun to adopt approaches quite similar to
that of Chief Judge Easterbrook’s en banc opinion for the Seventh
Circuit, albeit with some refinements and variations. These courts apply intermediate scrutiny, requiring that the challenged law have some
substantial relation to an important government interest.289 They emphasize that this test merely requires the fit between the government’s
objective and the challenged law to be “reasonable, not perfect,”290 so
that the government can “paint with a broader brush.”291 The government need not utilize the best or least restrictive means of achieving
its goal.292
The principal gloss that other courts have added to the Seventh
Circuit’s approach is that the degree of scrutiny applied should vary
depending on the magnitude of the burden that the challenged law
imposes on individuals’ legitimate interests in use of firearms.293 In
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 646–47, 651–52 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 647.
286 Id. at 652.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 653. Judge Sykes again expressed her preference for more vigorous protection of
the right to keep and bear arms in Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 694–711 (7th Cir. 2011);
see infra notes 324–33 and accompanying text.
289 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), No. 10-7036, 2011 WL 4551558, at *8–10
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 2011); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v.
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2476 (2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011); Kachalsky v. Cacace, No. 10-CV-5413 (CS), 2011 WL
3962550, at *25–30 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011); Osterweil v. Bartlett, No. 1:09-cv-825 (MAD/DRH),
2011 WL 1983340, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011); People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 825 (Ill.
App. Ct.), appeal granted, 949 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2011).
290 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98.
291 United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1172 (W.D. Tenn. 2009).
292 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98.
293 See, e.g., Chester, 628 F.3d at 682; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96–97; see also Ezell, 651
F.3d at 708 (determining that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Skoien permits this sliding scale
284
285
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other words, a court would require stronger justifications for a law
that severely limits the use of firearms for the core purpose of defending one’s home and family, like the District of Columbia laws struck
down in Heller, but require a weaker showing where the impact on
gun owners’ legitimate interests is modest.294 Most cases do not involve restrictions as severe as those in Heller, of course, and so making the intensity of judicial scrutiny vary according to the degree of
burden imposed is likely to help the government’s side in most instances. In other words, factoring the degree of burden on gun rights
into the intermediate scrutiny calculus is likely to be a useful mechanism for judges “rightly worried about gun crime and gun injury” who
“want to leave legislatures with some latitude in trying to fight crime
in ways that interfere little with lawful self-defense.”295
The Ninth Circuit’s panel decision in Nordyke v. King296 provides
a useful example. The case involved an ordinance in Alameda
County, California, which prohibited possession of firearms on county
property and thus had the effect of preventing gun shows from being
held at the county fairgrounds.297 Emphasizing the severity of the legal restrictions on guns struck down in Heller, the Ninth Circuit concluded that only laws which “substantially burden” the right to keep
and bear arms should receive heightened scrutiny.298 The court gave
the plaintiffs a chance to amend their complaint to allege facts showing a substantial burden on their rights,299 but the decision strongly
hinted that this would be a futile endeavor. In the court’s view, the
ultimate question would be whether the county’s action left reasonable alternative ways for law-abiding citizens to obtain firearms with
which to defend themselves.300 And in the end, there are places in
Alameda County, other than gun shows at the county fairgrounds,
where guns can be purchased.301
approach, with the level of scrutiny applied to the government’s action varying with the degree
of burden that action imposes on the right to keep and bear arms).
294 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97.
295 Volokh, supra note 275, at 1461.
296 Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir.
2011).
297 Id. at 780.
298 Id. at 782–86. The court did not decide what type of heightened scrutiny, such as strict
or intermediate scrutiny, would apply to laws that do substantially burden the right to keep and
bear arms. See id. at 786 n.9.
299 Id. at 789.
300 Id. at 787.
301 The Nordyke plaintiffs pointed out that there are only three licensed gun dealers in
Alameda County, and so the ban on gun shows at the county fairgrounds “ma[de] it more diffi-

750

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:703

By requiring a threshold showing of a significant burden on the
exercise of the right to keep and bear arms, courts reduce the number
of constitutional claims that even reach the intermediate scrutiny
stage where some showing of the challenged law’s probable effects is
required.302 The sorting achieved by the substantial burden framework thus sensibly pushes more of the job of evaluating gun control
laws away from judges and back to legislators.303
Reflecting the same pragmatic and cautious attitudes, courts’ decisions consistently downplay the usefulness of historical inquiries,
recognizing the difficulty of making comparisons across centuries during which so many vast technological, legal, social, and other changes
have occurred. Even where courts insist initially on undertaking a historical inquiry to determine whether an issue falls within the scope of
the right to keep and bear arms as that right was originally understood, the results are generally inconclusive, and the courts wind up
applying intermediate scrutiny.304 For example, the Founding Fathers’
firearms did not have serial numbers; the practice of putting such
numbers on guns did not begin until many decades after the Second
Amendment was adopted.305 Does this imply that the original understanding of the right to keep and bear arms clearly protects unnumbered guns? And if so, should courts strike down the federal law that
today prohibits possession of firearms with removed or altered serial
numbers?306 Courts have recognized that this sort of argument overstates the extent to which historical analysis can provide answers to
the specific issues that arise in contemporary constitutional adjudication. Concluding that the Founding generation wanted to protect a
right to possess firearms without serial numbers “would make little
sense” given that people in that era “had no concept of that characteristic or how it fit within the right to bear arms.”307
The lively debate over original understandings about felonies,
misdemeanors, and guns has an equally anachronistic flair. As noted
cult to go out and shop for guns.” Bob Egelko, Gun Show Promoters Suffer Legal Setback, S.F.
CHRON., May 3, 2011, at C4 (quoting the plaintiffs’ lawyer, Donald Kilmer). The Ninth Circuit
declared, however, that “regulations of gun sales do not substantially burden Second Amendment rights merely because they make it more difficult to obtain a gun.” Nordyke, 644 F.3d at
788.
302 See supra notes 268–72 and accompanying text.
303 Nordyke, 644 F.3d at 785.
304 See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680–82 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91–95, 97 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011).
305 See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 n.11.
306 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2006).
307 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 94.
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earlier, scholars do not agree on whether eighteenth century minds
considered felons outside the scope of the right to keep and bear
arms.308 Historical research often fails to generate clear answers but
the problem is compounded here because basic matters regarding
criminal offense categories like felonies and misdemeanors have
changed so much over time. In the Founding era, felonies “were typically punishable by death and imprisonment for such offenses was
rare,” and “many serious crimes, such as kidnapping and assault with
intent to murder or rape, were classified as misdemeanors.”309 In a
time when a felony conviction was essentially a death sentence, the
issue of whether a felon should have the right to keep and bear arms
was nonsensical. The Founding Fathers surely did not devote time to
pondering whether prisoners awaiting execution, let alone those already put to death, should have access to firearms. On top of this,
even if historical research could conclusively establish that felons were
never disarmed in colonial America, that would still prove little, because firearm possession by felons may have been left unregulated “as
a matter of public policy, not right.”310 For example, early American
legislators may have simply thought that disarming convicted
criminals would be “highly impractical in a frontier society, in which
isolated communities struggled to survive in rugged conditions.”311
Given these difficulties in comparing the eighteenth-century world to
our times, the effort to decide Second Amendment cases through historical analysis becomes a “virtually meaningless” exercise.312
In cases involving the federal law that prohibits individuals with
domestic violence misdemeanor convictions from possessing guns, the
historical picture becomes even murkier. For example, a defendant in
federal court in Wisconsin tried to use the historical route to challenge
that law by arguing “that there is a modern stigma attached to crimes
of domestic violence which was not extant in the 18th century” and
that “the Founding Fathers would not have viewed domestic violence
as seriously as we do today.”313 Exploring how American society
viewed domestic violence in the Founding era might be a fascinating
topic for a doctoral dissertation, but it would undoubtedly be a challenging undertaking for judges, and ultimately a pointless one because
See supra notes 164–70 and accompanying text.
United States v. Walker, 709 F. Supp. 2d 460, 466 (E.D. Va. 2010).
310 United States v. Brown, 715 F. Supp. 2d 688, 696 (E.D. Va. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
311 Id.
312 Walker, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
313 United States v. Li, No. 08-CR-212, 2008 WL 4610318, at *3–4 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2008).
308
309
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the historical record on an issue of such complexity undoubtedly contains much to support many different views.314 Judges simply will be
disappointed if they hope to find specific and clear historical evidence
about the Founding generation’s attitude toward the rights of domestic abusers.315 And even if such evidence could be found, “mapping
colonial analogues onto the Constitution as it exists today would produce incongruous results—while men who beat their wives would remain free to own guns, Catholics and African Americans, among
others, would have no Second Amendment rights.”316
A consensus among the lower courts on how to handle Second
Amendment claims thus seems to be emerging from the confusion and
uncertainty that followed in Heller’s wake. An intermediate scrutiny
analysis, applied in a way that is very deferential to legislative determinations and requires merely some logical and plausible showing of
the basis for the law’s reasonably expected benefits, is the heart of the
emerging standard approach. Historical analysis has taken a backseat.
And over and over, courts have concluded that the gun laws being
challenged should be upheld as constitutional.317
314

See generally OVER THE THRESHOLD: INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN EARLY AMERICA (Chris-

tine Daniels & Michael V. Kennedy eds., 1999).
315 For example, the court in United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D. W. Va.
2010), aff’d, No. 10-4936, 2012 WL 698885 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2012), acknowledged that “[h]owever
regrettable it may seem today, domestic violence was not a separate criminal offense and was
probably not even viewed as especially problematic in most circles during the Founding Era.”
Id. at 588. The court nevertheless undertook an extensive historical analysis and found that that
the Founders generally would have been comfortable with substantial restrictions on guns in the
interests of public safety, including bans on possession for types of people considered dangerous.
Id. at 588–92. Another judge looking at the same sort of historical evidence found it thoroughly
unhelpful. See United States v. Elkins, 780 F. Supp. 2d 473, 478 (W.D. Va. 2011) (“No facts have
been produced to show that the drafters of the Second Amendment contemplated that domestic
violence restraining orders would exist, let alone cause an individual to lose his rights.”).
Brown, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 698.
See Anna Stolley Persky, An Unsteady Finger on Gun Control Laws: Despite 2nd
Amendment Cases, Firearms Codes Are Moving Targets, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2010, at 14 (observing
that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald have not had a significant practical
impact on gun policy throughout the country because so few challenges to federal, state, or local
laws have been successful). In addition to the many examples discussed already in this Article, a
wide variety of other gun laws and regulations have been sustained by the courts. See, e.g.,
Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 774 (7th Cir. 2009) (upholding municipal ordinance
requiring registration of all firearms), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3410 (2010); Peterson v. LaCabe,
783 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1176–78 (D. Colo. 2011) (upholding a law preventing nonresidents of state
from obtaining permits to carry concealed handguns); United States v. Hart, 726 F. Supp. 2d 56,
60 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding that the Second Amendment does not provide a right to carry a
concealed weapon); Dorr v. Weber, 741 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1004–05 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (same);
Commonwealth v. Runyan, 922 N.E.2d 794, 799–800 (Mass. 2010) (upholding a state law requir316
317
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Although most courts have gravitated in the same general direction, some decisions have suggested other paths. The courts nevertheless have been remarkably unanimous in rejecting the strict scrutiny
standard of review.318 But one ruling by the federal district court in
Utah in United States v. Engstrum319 seemed for a time to be the first
spark in what could grow to be a line of decisions employing a strict
scrutiny standard. Considering a challenge to the federal ban on guns
for domestic violence misdemeanants, Engstrum concluded that strict
scrutiny should apply based on the simple syllogism that all fundamental rights receive strict scrutiny and that the right to keep and bear
arms is a fundamental right.320 The court held that the defendant essentially could use the Second Amendment as an affirmative defense
at trial, with the jury being instructed that they should acquit if they
found that the defendant posed no risk of prospective or future violence despite his past domestic violence misdemeanor conviction.321
The case thus seemed to be a significant departure from the general
trend in the lower courts, not only because it applied strict scrutiny,
but also because it found that a federal gun law was unconstitutional
at least as applied to some individuals.322 The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, however, quickly stepped in and issued a writ of
mandamus rejecting the district court’s reading of Heller and directing
the district court not to instruct the jury about a Second Amendment
defense.323 As a result, the cupboard remains bare for those hoping
courts might apply strict scrutiny and be more aggressive about finding constitutional defects in gun laws beyond the type struck down in
Heller.
ing guns to be stored securely when not being carried or otherwise under the owner’s immediate
control).
318 The courts’ rejection of strict scrutiny is particularly striking given that before Heller, it
was widely assumed that strict scrutiny would apply if the Supreme Court ever interpreted the
Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to have guns for nonmilitia purposes. See,
e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Putting the Gun Control Debate in Social Perspective, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 477, 484 (2004) (challenging the assumption that strict scrutiny would apply). Much of the
credit for dissuading courts from applying strict scrutiny under the Second Amendment surely
goes to Professor Adam Winkler, whose work undercut the premise that fundamental constitutional rights always or even usually receive strict scrutiny. See Adam Winkler, Fundamentally
Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 227 (2006) (finding that “only a
small subset of fundamental rights triggers strict scrutiny”).
319 United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah), mandamus granted sub
nom. In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195 app. (10th Cir. 2009).
320 Id. at 1231–32.
321 Id. at 1235.
322 Id.
323 In re United States, 578 F.3d at 1199–200.

754

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:703

Of course, proponents of a more robust version of the right to
keep and bear arms may yet have a breakthrough in the lower courts.
For example, they saw reason for hope in Ezell v. City of Chicago,324 a
decision concerning new ordinances enacted by Chicago to replace
those invalidated by the McDonald decision.325 Chicago’s new laws
require all gun owners to have firearm permits, and one of the requirements for such a permit is completing at least one hour of training at a shooting range.326 At the same time, Chicago did not permit
the operation of any shooting ranges within city limits.327 Although
the district court had found that this placed no significant burden on
anyone’s rights because there are plenty of firing ranges open to the
public within just a few miles of the city,328 Judge Rovner of the Seventh Circuit admonished Chicago for being “too clever by half” and
essentially “thumbing [its] nose at the Supreme Court.”329 The court
remanded the case to give the city a chance to present evidence justifying its ban on firing ranges, but hinted that it seemed “quite unlikely” that the city could succeed in doing so.330 The opinion
suggested that the Seventh Circuit, despite taking a very deferential
attitude toward the type and amount of evidence needed to justify a
gun regulation in Chief Judge Easterbrook’s en banc opinion in
Skoien,331 might take a much more aggressive attitude, one that almost
rises to the level of strict scrutiny, in situations involving severe burdens on the core right of armed self-defense.332 Gun rights advocates
324

Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).

325

CHI. MUN. CODE § 8-20-10 to -300 (2011).

326

Id. § 8-20-120(a)(7).

See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 695 (noting that CHI. MUN. CODE § 8-20-10, subsequently repealed, prohibited shooting ranges within city limits).
327

328

Id. at 693.

329

Id. at 711–12 (Rovner, J., concurring in the judgment).

Id. at 710 (majority opinion). While awaiting the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, city attorneys
predicted that the case might produce a decision that would be unfavorable to the city and
imperil other local gun restrictions, and so Chicago officials tried to render the case moot by
quickly doing away with the ban on firing ranges. John Byrne & Hal Dardick, City Council OKs
Gun Ranges as Federal Court Reverses Ban, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 2011, at C11. The Seventh Circuit, however, beat Chicago to the punch. Just an hour before the city council’s vote to repeal
the challenged ban, the Seventh Circuit released its decision, issuing it in typescript form, “a
practice ordinarily reserved for emergency action.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 5135, 2011
WL 4501546, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2011). Despite the ban’s repeal, the litigation continues
because the defendant contends that the new ordinance imposes an unduly burdensome “thicket
of regulations” on firing ranges. Id. at *2.
330

331 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1674 (2011); see supra notes 253–82 and accompanying text.
332

Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708.
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hailed the ruling as a “major win,”333 and the opinion certainly leans in
the direction of giving the right to keep and bear arms somewhat
stronger protection than most judges have thus far been willing to offer.334 Nevertheless, it is remarkable to think that this decision, a ruling that enables Chicagoans to travel a slightly shorter distance to
firing ranges,335 is the most dramatic advance for gun rights made by
the lower courts in the years since Heller.
Perhaps the most revealing discussion of the controversy surrounding the interpretation of the Second Amendment appears in
opinions issued by members of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the ongoing litigation concerning the District of Columbia’s
gun laws.336 After the Supreme Court invalidated portions of those
laws in Heller in 2008, the District revised the laws in an attempt to
comply with the Supreme Court’s demands while maintaining unusually tight restrictions on access to firearms.337 Several residents of the
District quickly filed suit, claiming that many provisions of the revised
statutes violated the Second Amendment.338 By a 2–1 vote, the D.C.
Circuit upheld some of the challenged measures and remanded the
case for development of a more complete evidentiary record concerning other provisions under attack.339 Judge Douglas Ginsburg’s majority opinion and Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s dissent laid out starkly
different ways of reading the Supreme Court’s rulings in Heller and
McDonald. Judge Ginsburg explained that, although gun regulations
with longstanding roots may enjoy a special presumption of validity,
history and tradition should not constitute the only elements of Second Amendment analysis.340 Rather, courts should apply intermediate scrutiny, look at the public policy objectives that the challenged
regulation purportedly serves in modern society, and defer to legislative judgments supported by some “meaningful evidence.”341
333 David Hardy, Ezell v. Chicago—Major Win!, ARMS & L. (July 6, 2011, 10:44 AM), http:/
/armsandthelaw.com/archives/2011/07/ezell_v_chicago.php.
334 Judge Sykes, the author of the Ezell panel’s opinion, was the sole member of the Seventh Circuit who dissented from Chief Judge Easterbrook’s en banc opinion in Skoien. See
supra notes 283–88 and accompanying text.
335 See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 699.
336 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), No. 10-7036, 2011 WL 4551558 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
4, 2011).
337 See Rostron, supra note 33, at 394–403.
338 Heller II, 2011 WL 4551558, at *1–2. Dick Heller, the named respondent in the case
decided by the Supreme Court, is among the plaintiffs in the new litigation.
339 Id. at *1.
340 Id. at *6.
341 Id. at *8–11.
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Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent regards the Supreme Court’s decisions
as instead requiring courts to analyze gun laws “based on text, history,
and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate
scrutiny.”342 Indeed, he pointed out that the deferential form of intermediate scrutiny applied by Judge Ginsburg and most other lower
court judges resembles the flexible policy-oriented analysis proposed
in Justice Breyer’s Heller dissent more than it resembles the rigidly
categorical and deeply historical approach favored by Justice Scalia
and the other four Justices who joined his majority opinion in Heller.343 Judge Kavanaugh is correct, but he is a lone voice in a sea of
lower court judges preferring to give public policy considerations a
preeminent role in Second Amendment analysis.
IV. CELEBRATING JUSTICE BREYER’S TRIUMPH
A great irony thus runs throughout the lower court cases. The
Heller decision was undoubtedly a monumental step in Second
Amendment jurisprudence, a crowning achievement for Justice Scalia,
and a masterful showcase for the originalist methodology of constitutional interpretation. The McDonald decision followed through on
the crucial step of extending the right to keep and bear arms to reach
state and local government actions. And yet, the lower court decisions and the analytical approach that has begun to crystallize in them
reflect Justice Breyer’s sentiments about Second Amendment claims
far more than those of Justice Scalia or the other members of the
Court who formed the majorities in Heller and McDonald.
This is not to say that judges have improperly set out to follow
dissenting views rather than those of the Supreme Court’s majority.
Instead, while conscientiously trying to implement the Supreme
Court’s instructions, judges have ineluctably followed an analysis that
fulfills Justice Breyer’s forecast.344 Trying to follow Justice Scalia’s
lead by making Second Amendment analysis an intensely historical
enterprise, lower court judges have run into the reality that historical
inquiries are extremely difficult and do not produce determinate answers to the types of detailed questions that must be resolved concernId. at *23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at *26–32.
344 In a recent debate with Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm, Professor Lawrence Rosenthal
suggested that the sort of interest balancing that Justice Breyer favored may be inescapable even
though the Heller majority denounced such an approach. See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee
Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control
Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 85, 94 (2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2010/24/LRColl2010n24Rosenthal&Malcolm.pdf.
342
343
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ing the wide range of gun laws and regulations in effect in various
places throughout the country. Puzzled by Justice Scalia’s curious list
of longstanding and presumptively lawful regulatory measures and the
Supreme Court’s conspicuous refusal to identify a level of scrutiny or
some other specific standard to be applied, lower court judges have
pulled toward an intermediate scrutiny approach that gives them the
comfort of applying familiar formulas and enables them to show due
respect for the right to keep and bear arms while rarely ever actually
using it to strike down a law. Struggling to work within the more categorical framework of decisionmaking favored by Justice Scalia, the
lower courts have essentially wound up embracing the sort of interest
balancing that Justice Breyer recommended and that Scalia vociferously denounced.345 And like Justice Breyer, the lower courts have
looked at the conflicting tangle of complex empirical and other research surrounding gun laws and essentially decided that legislatures
are better suited than judges for the task of deciding what conclusions
to draw from it.
Of course, the lower court decisions cannot cite Breyer’s dissents
as their inspiration. But there are passages in Breyer’s Heller and McDonald dissents that capture quite well the flavor of the already enormous and quickly growing volume of precedent being generated by
the lower courts, and so it is worth reviewing them. According to
Breyer, Second Amendment questions that confront courts do not
have “purely logical or conceptual answers.”346 Treacherous “reefs
and shoals” also “lie in wait for those nonexpert judges who place
virtually determinative weight upon historical considerations.”347 The
judges’ task instead requires them “to focus on practicalities, the statute’s rationale, the problems that called it into being, its relation to
those objectives—in a word, the details.”348 And in the end, judges
cannot avoid essentially weighing the advantages and disadvantages of
sustaining the government actions being challenged. However one
describes the level of scrutiny involved or articulates the standard
used, the decisionmaking “will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on
one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other,
the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly
345 Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), with id. at 689
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
346 Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
347 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3122 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
348 Heller, 554 U.S. at 687.
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burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter.”349 Justice
Breyer saw “practical wisdom” in this approach,350 and the lower court
decisions have admirably fulfilled that promise.
Any appraisal of the lower courts’ approach will depend greatly
on one’s views about gun control and gun rights and what outcomes
one ultimately prefers. But there are some reasons to appreciate what
the lower courts have done regardless of which side one supports in
the greater debate about guns. Most important, the courts essentially
have adopted a posture of judicial restraint, upholding legislative determinations where ample room for debate exists about their constitutionality. Courts are routinely criticized for purported sins of judicial
activism,351 and so they certainly deserve some understanding where
they proceed cautiously. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III eloquently and
candidly described how this factor influenced the Fourth Circuit’s
treatment of the right to keep and bear arms:
To the degree that we push the right beyond what the Supreme Court in Heller declared to be its origin, we circumscribe the scope of popular governance, move the action into
court, and encourage litigation in contexts we cannot foresee. This is serious business. We do not wish to be even minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem
because in the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment rights. . . .
If ever there was an occasion for restraint, this would
seem to be it. There is much to be said for a course of simple
caution.352
Treading carefully is particularly appropriate with respect to an
issue for which the need for judicial intervention to protect rights is
not at its zenith. Gun owners are a perennially potent political force.
The most prominent organization representing their interests, the National Rifle Association, is among the Nation’s most powerful lobbying organizations.353 The political tide has been moving against gun
Id. at 689.
Id. at 691.
351 See Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., The Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of Activism,
24 CONST. COMMENT. 103, 103 (2007) (describing how criticism of judicial activism has become
common). Justice Scalia has always been a vocal critic of judicial activism and proponent of
judicial restraint. See, e.g., James Edward Wyszynski, Jr., Comment, In Praise of Judicial Restraint: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 1989 DETROIT C. L. REV. 117, 120 (1989).
352 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475–76 (4th Cir. 2011).
353 See Dan Eggen, Another Victory for the Bulletproof NRA, WASH. POST, June 17, 2010,
at A19; Eric Lichtblau, Beyond Guns: N.R.A. Expands Political Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
2010, at A1.
349
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control in recent years, with the conventional wisdom being that gun
issues hurt Democratic candidates in key elections in the past.354 Despite some gun enthusiasts’ fears that President Barack Obama’s election posed a significant threat to firearm rights, the Obama
Administration has been very quiet on gun issues.355 Considering the
many problems facing this country (wars, terrorism, climate change, a
struggling economy, budget deficits, illegal immigration, and healthcare, just to name a few), insufficient access to firearms hardly seems
to be a pressing concern. Judges’ reluctance to be more aggressive in
expanding gun rights and overriding political and legislative processes
seems defensible. Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in Heller made
this very point, arguing that “no one has suggested that the political
process is not working exactly as it should in mediating the debate
between the advocates and opponents of gun control,” and so “adherence to a policy of judicial restraint would be far wiser” than unnecessarily bold action to invalidate gun laws and regulations.356
The courts’ cautious approach also serves the interests of federalism and respects the wide variation in the roles that guns play in different parts of the country, particularly differences between rural and
urban areas. City dwellers are “less likely to own guns and more
likely to support gun control initiatives.”357 Rates of gun violence obviously vary dramatically from place to place,358 as do cultural traditions concerning firearms and the extent to which state and local laws
regulate them.359 Justice Breyer’s dissents in Heller and McDonald
specifically argued for recognition of these differences, repeatedly emphasizing that the District of Columbia and Chicago are highly urban
areas with crime problems unknown in rural areas.360
354 See Dick Polman, Gun-Shy Dems Abandon Debate on Gun Control, RECORD (Bergen
County, N.J.), May 21, 2009, at A21.
355 See BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, PRESIDENT OBAMA’S FIRST YEAR:
FAILED LEADERSHIP, LOST LIVES 2 (2010) (giving President Obama failing grades for his handling of gun issues). For my advice about how the Obama Administration should address the
topic of guns, see Allen Rostron, Cease Fire: A “Win-Win” Strategy on Gun Policy for the
Obama Administration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2009).
356 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 680 n.39 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
357 Erik Luna, The .22 Caliber Rorschach Test, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 53, 89–90 (2002) (footnote
omitted).
358 See Richard Florida, The Geography of Gun Deaths, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2011, 10:38
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/01/the-geography-of-gun-deaths/69354.
359 President Barack Obama has emphasized these different experiences and perspectives
on the few occasions when he has addressed the topic of gun control. See Rostron, supra note
355, at 357–58.
360 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3128–29 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Heller, 554 U.S. at 681–82, 696, 698–99, 722 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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After Heller, Professor Michael O’Shea made a scholarly plea for
implementing the right to keep and bear arms in ways attuned to federalism values, arguing that a “bifurcated standard of review” should
apply so that national gun laws would be subject to greater scrutiny
than state and local ones.361 The Supreme Court, however, rejected
the possibility of tailoring the right in that manner when it ruled in
McDonald that incorporation of the right to keep and bear arms
through the Fourteenth Amendment demands that exactly the same
standards apply to state and local laws as to federal ones.362
Justice Stevens’s dissent in McDonald warned that this insistence
on perfect symmetry as applied to all levels of government created a
“real risk” that the right would wind up being diluted.363 “When one
legal standard must prevail across dozens of jurisdictions with disparate needs and customs,” Stevens predicted, “courts will often settle
on a relaxed standard.”364 If a tailor decided to adopt a one-size-fitsall policy, it would have to make suits big enough to accommodate its
largest customers. Stevens specifically warned gun rights proponents
to temper their celebrations, for when forced by the McDonald decision to settle on a single standard for analyzing gun rights claims,
lower courts would face tremendous pressure to adopt a very deferential standard in order to avoid trampling excessively on “the diverse
interests of the States and their long history of regulating in this sensitive area.”365
The lower court decisions implementing Heller and McDonald
seem to bear out these prophecies. Judges know that they cannot tailor different degrees of scrutiny for local laws versus state or national
ones. They cannot say that the strength of the right to keep and bear
arms is different in urban and rural settings. The lower courts therefore may be understandably reluctant to find violations of this constitutional right when doing so would mean stifling the ability of various
governments to try new and different ways of dealing with gun issues.
As Justice Louis Brandeis noted in his much-quoted ode to the benefits of letting states serve as laboratories testing new and different policies, “To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a
Michael P. O’Shea, Federalism and the Implementation of the Right to Arms, 59 SYRAL. REV. 201, 215–17 (2008).
362 See supra notes 114–22 and accompanying text.
363 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3095 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also O’Shea, supra note 361,
at 217–20 (warning about the risk of constitutional “dilution” if the Second Amendment right
must be incorporated and applied to state and local laws in a “jot-for-jot” manner).
364 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3095.
365 Id. at 3095 n.13.
361
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grave responsibility.”366 By adopting a deferential and restrained approach to gun rights claims, the lower courts properly respect the importance of that responsibility.
The lower courts’ deferential approach to firearm legislation has
the additional virtue of synchronizing constitutional law and public
opinion about these matters. Most Americans believe that they
should have the right to own and use guns.367 About two-thirds of
Americans agree with the Supreme Court’s decisions striking down
handgun bans.368 At the same time, the vast majority of Americans
believe that gun control laws should either be made stricter or kept
just as they are now.369 For example, most Americans support a nationwide ban on assault weapons and high-capacity ammunition
magazines.370 In short, by striking down only the most severe restrictions on guns like handgun bans and upholding other regulations and
restrictions, courts have been achieving the results that most Americans want.371
Finally, the lower courts’ approach to the right to keep and bear
arms also has the simple virtue of being candid. Justice Breyer argued
that no matter what results they reach about the right to keep and
bear arms, courts should be honest about the weighing of interests
that inevitably underlies their decisionmaking.372 His approach’s
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See Rostron, supra note 33, at 413 & n.163 (citing poll data).
368 See, e.g., CBS NEWS, CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES POLL: THE ECONOMY, THE BUDGET
DEFICIT, AND GUN CONTROL (2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/Jan11_Econ.pdf (finding that sixty-five percent of respondents oppose and thirty-two percent favor a ban on the sale
of all handguns).
369 See, e.g., ABT SRBI, TIME MAGAZINE/ABT SRBI—JUNE 20–21, 2011 SURVEY (2011),
http://www.srbi.com/TimePoll5380-Final%20Report-2011-06-22.pdf (finding that fifty-one percent of respondents want gun laws to be more strict, thirty-nine percent prefer no change, and
only seven percent want gun laws to be less strict); CBS News, supra note 368 (finding that fortysix percent of respondents want gun laws to be more strict, thirty-eight percent prefer no change,
and only thirteen percent want gun laws to be less strict); HART/MCINTURFF, STUDY NO. 11023:
NBC NEWS/WALL STREET JOURNAL SURVEY 19 (2011), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/
Sections/NEWS/A_Politics/___Politics_Today_Stories_Teases/11023%20Jan%20NBC-WSJ%20
Filled%20in%20beta.pdf (finding that fifty-two percent of respondents want gun laws to be
more strict, thirty-seven percent prefer no change, and only ten percent want gun laws to be less
strict).
370 See, e.g., ABT SRBI, supra note 369 (finding that sixty-two percent of respondents support a ban on sale of semiautomatic assault weapons); CBS NEWS, supra note 368 (finding that
sixty-three percent of respondents support a ban on sale of assault weapons and sixty-three percent support a ban on sale of high-capacity magazines).
371 See Rostron, supra note 33, at 412–13 & nn.161–62 (discussing courts’ tendency to gravitate toward the predominant view of the American public on controversial issues like gun control, affirmative action, and abortion).
372 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 719 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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“necessary transparency lays bare the judge’s reasoning for all to see
and to criticize.”373 Justice Breyer found it much more difficult to discern the reasoning behind the Supreme Court majority’s conclusions.374 The lower courts have felt the same way, repeatedly
expressing frustration about the Supreme Court’s failure to explain
why, for example, it emphasized the crucial role of historical inquiry
and yet presented a list of presumptively lawful regulatory measures
supported by no such analysis.375 Determining the proper limits on
the right to keep and bear arms requires courts to make a profusion of
difficult choices with significant consequences for society, and judges
should strive to be as straightforward as possible with themselves and
the public about the factors that drive their decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
Two major battles over the right to keep and bear arms have already produced important victories for gun rights, but the third battle
is still underway. This third battle will ultimately determine the real
impact of this entire constitutional conflict. The cases decided so far
by the lower courts suggest that the result will be a right that is broad
but not particularly deep. In other words, although the right now extends to nonmilitia activities like defending one’s home and family
against criminal attackers, the courts apply the right in ways that result in the vast majority of gun laws surviving constitutional scrutiny
and the invalidation of only the most extraordinarily severe restrictions. Near the end of his dissenting opinion in Heller, Justice Stevens
warned that the District of Columbia’s laws struck down in that case
might be “just the first of an unknown number of dominoes to be
knocked off the table,”376 but the lower courts’ cautious and pragmatic
approach to implementation of the Heller and McDonald decisions
suggests that the practical impact of the Supreme Court’s reinvigoration of the right to keep and bear arms ultimately will be quite limited.
Of course, the lower courts may change directions and steer away
from the course they appear to be charting. Alternatively, the Supreme Court may decide to take another gun case and address more
clearly what sort of scrutiny or other analysis should be applied to
Id.
Id.
375 See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047–49 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich,
J., concurring) (describing the tension between the Supreme Court’s dictum in Heller about presumptively valid regulations and the detailed textual and historical analysis that the Supreme
Court otherwise employed).
376 Heller, 554 U.S. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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laws challenged as violations of the right to keep and bear arms. Both
Heller and McDonald were 5–4 decisions and could someday be overruled if a single vote shifts.377 But the better strategy for Justice
Breyer and his allies on the Court is not to undertake a direct assault
aimed at overturning Heller and McDonald. Instead, Breyer and his
allies should accept those decisions, celebrate the importance of the
right to keep and bear arms, and focus on ensuring that the right is
implemented so as to give legislatures wide leeway to craft laws that
reasonably seek to reduce risks of the misuse of firearms. As one federal judge recently put it, “Prudent, measured arms restrictions for
public safety are not inconsistent with a strong and thriving Second
Amendment.”378 If Justice Breyer can bring together a majority of the
Supreme Court under that banner, he will have won a decisive victory
in the third and ultimately most important phase of the legal fight
over the right to keep and bear arms.

377 Rostron, supra note 107, at 159, 167 (describing how U.S. Senators expressed concerns
during the hearings on the Supreme Court nominations of Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan
that the margin of victory for gun rights in Heller and McDonald was a single vote).
378 Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 799 (9th Cir.) (Gould, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment), reh’g en banc granted, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011).

